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HAS CONDUCT IN IRAQ CONFIRMED THE
MORAL INADEQUACY OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW? EXAMINING THE
CONFLUENCE BETWEEN CONTRACT
THEORY AND THE SCOPE OF CIVILIAN
IMMUNITY DURING ARMED CONFLICT
SAMUEL VINCENT JONES*
INTRODUCTION
It is 11:00 A.M. on June 15, 2003, in Fallujah, Iraq.1 The stench
of bloody corpses reveals the effects of U.S. army rocket fire within
the Iraqi town. The rockets nearly demolished an entire building and
killed approximately two hundred people, many of whom were
women and children. All of the dead are clad in civilian clothes, and
there is no evidence of a uniformed soldier among the dead. Media
reports capture vivid scenes of relatives crying over corpses and
charred children’s toys. The images drive home the realization that
small children and babies are among the dead. Human rights
activists, newspaper editors, and anti-war critics immediately
characterize the incident as an example of U.S. noncompliance with
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1. Hypothetical scenario.
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International Humanitarian Law (IHL).2 Few observers, if any,
consider that the attack may have been lawful. On the contrary, the
civilian casualties, in the opinion of most observers, are a result of
illegal conduct on the part of the United States during its occupation
of Iraq.
Knowledge of the circumstances preceding the attack, however,
might prompt many observers to reach a different conclusion. Three
hours before the collapse of the building that killed the men, women,
and children, a team of fifteen British soldiers responded to a report
3
that armed insurgents were kidnapping young boys between the ages
of nine and fourteen from their homes at gunpoint. The insurgents
savagely beat and left for dead any boy or adult who resisted.
4
Consistent with their duties under IHL, the British soldiers
proceeded to the scene to restore order and provide medical aid.
When the soldiers arrived on the scene, the streets appeared calm.
Two Iraqi men selling fruit and a boy, who purportedly had witnessed
the incidents, told the soldiers of a badly beaten mother who had
tried to protect her son. These informants told the soldiers that the
woman was bleeding inside a taxicab. When the soldiers located the
cab, the driver waved a white flag and threw his hands into the air.
As the team approached, the vehicle exploded, instantly killing three
of the soldiers.

2. In the context of this Article, “International Humanitarian law” is the contemporary
expression for that part of international law regulating the conduct of hostilities. It also is
commonly referred to as the “law of armed conflict” and “law of war.”
3. The term “insurgent,” as used in this Article, refers to those persons who do not form
part of an organized army and are not recognized by any international body. Instead, they
constitute a resistance fighting force that conducts clandestine and sporadic offensive operations
against occupying armies in occupied territories. As applied in the context of the U.S.-led
occupation in Iraq, the term “insurgent” includes the reported twenty thousand resistance
fighters, most of whom are Iraqis, currently exacting violence against the peaceful Iraqi civilian
populace and coalition forces in Iraq. See Paul Reynolds, Iraq Two Years On: Endgame or
Unending War, BBC NEWS, Apr. 6, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/
4413121.stm (reporting insurgency strength at approximately “20,000”); see also General John
Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command, Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Oct. 2,
2005) (transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9542948) (stating during an
interview with Tim Russert that “there’s no more than 20,000 insurgents in Iraq” and
acknowledging that foreign fighters have “killed well over 5,000” innocent Iraqi civilians in
2005).
4. Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter HR or Hague Regulations], reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 80-81 (Richard Guelff & Adam Roberts eds., 3d ed., 2000).
This Article assumes that at the time of the incident described in the introduction, the U.S.-led
coalition forces in Iraq were occupiers. The incident occurred weeks before the legal question
regarding occupation status was put to rest in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546.
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Unbeknownst to the soldiers, the cab had been rigged with
explosives controlled by a remote detonator. Seconds after the
explosion, a civilian vehicle sped toward the soldiers, and its
passengers immediately opened fire on them. The soldiers entered a
small house for protection. They noticed that they were receiving a
barrage of fire from several positions in the building facing them. Six
of the soldiers were badly wounded. The team, which was grossly
outgunned, estimated that they were fighting roughly a hundred
armed insurgents.
The leader recognized the gravity of the situation and advised his
commander of the attack via radio, saying that he expected to be
overrun in ten to fifteen minutes. Approximately five minutes later, a
U.S. army helicopter that had been conducting a separate mission
nearby arrived on the scene to assist the British soldiers. The U.S.
pilot identified the multiple rocket and machine-gun positions used
by the insurgents. Given the insurgents’ superior firepower and the
likelihood that the British soldiers trapped inside the small building
would not survive much longer, the pilot fired rockets into the
foundational pillars of the building housing the insurgents, causing
the entire front half of the building to collapse. The insurgent fire
stopped immediately.
Unknown to the helicopter pilot, but widely known to the
insurgents, there were uninvolved men, women, and children inside
the building that the insurgents were using as their firing position.
After the British team escaped with their wounded and dead, a
Middle Eastern news agency publicized the effects of the helicopter
attack and reported the incident as another U.S.-led atrocity. The
ensuing public outrage manifested in the form of demonstrations and
demands that the American pilot be tried for war crimes. The U.S.
response was that the destruction of the building was justified by the
military necessity of the situation, and that the insurgents bore the
blame for the incidental lost of innocent civilian lives. The military’s
internal investigation of the incident exonerated the pilot of any
wrongdoing. Some commentators noted that, even if it had not been
necessary to destroy the building, the pilot’s conduct was not a war
crime because the helicopter attack could be considered a reprisal
against “terrorists” (suspected) responsible for the 9/11 attacks or,
more immediately, the illegal ambush against the British soldiers.
The aforementioned hypothetical scenario epitomizes the type of
situations that occupying armies like those of the United States and
the United Kingdom encounter nearly every day, and will continue to
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encounter. This Article examines whether the juridical construct
governing conduct under conditions encountered in present-day Iraq
is adequately positioned to protect the innocent civilian populace.
Policy concerns for the safety of civilians and resistance fighters has
led to juridical symmetry between hostile and peaceful civilians and
created incoherence between the aim of IHL and the juridical models
used to achieve the goal of IHL.
This Article posits that, while IHL relative to civilian immunity
must be respected, securing its juridical goal of protecting the
innocent from violence can only be attained by considering the
impact of doctrinal models and abstract theories that inform norms
during armed conflict. The reality of the doctrine of military
necessity and of the socio-contractarian aspects of hostilities prevent
IHL from operating as a coherent framework. IHL should be
approached using coherence theory or by incorporating practical legal
“reasoning from ends to appropriate means.”5 That is, in order to
achieve juridical coherency, IHL must be applied to produce an
outcome that is consistent with its overall aim or purpose of
safeguarding the peaceful civilian populace.
This Article argues that a refusal to accept coherence as a
necessary value within international humanitarian jurisprudence
hinders the restoration of law and order in occupied territories and
significantly erodes well-established legal principles of distinction,
blurring the line between hostile and peaceful civilians. As a result,
present-day armed conflict has begun to regress to an indiscriminate
form of warfare, or as referred to by some, total war. These
conditions are adverse to the humanitarian principles designed to
protect peaceful civilians and prevent excessive violence. As evident
by the armed conflict in Iraq, incoherency in current juridical models,
such as Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, not only impedes an
occupying army’s ability to protect peaceful civilians, but it also
removes incentives for occupying forces to properly weigh the
humanitarian objectives of IHL against the necessity of military
attacks. These circumstances have led to widespread global contempt
for the U.S.-led occupying forces in Iraq, despite their attempts to
comply with IHL and the insurgency’s continued use of treacherous
measures of warfare.

5. John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 869, 908 (2002).
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Part I of this Article discusses the law of occupation and how the
lawfulness of an occupation impacts the duty that the civilian
populace in an occupied territory owes to the occupying power. Part
II addresses the scope and limitations of a civilian’s duty and rights
regarding participation in hostilities and the degree to which
incoherent and ambiguous juridical constructs create legal symmetry
between insurgents and peaceful civilians and compromise the aims
of IHL to minimize hardship and reduce violence to the civilian
populace. Part III discusses the application of the military necessity
doctrine and how insurgencies and reductions in well established
combatant—noncombatant distinction standards affect the
proportionality analysis required under juridical constructs and
cohere with the aim of IHL. Part IV explores the socio-contractarian
aspect of armed conflict and illustrates the normative influences and
conditions by which adversaries deem themselves legally excused
from certain legal obligations and within their rights to impose
obligations upon their adversary to alter behavior. In so doing, Part
IV demonstrates the confluence between contract theory and the law
and customs of armed conflict. It addresses the legality of reprisals,
the degree to which reprisals inform normative values within the
civilian populace and how reprisals, despite their utility, may free the
peaceful civilian from their duty to refrain from hostilities.
This Article does not contend that the United States is an
undeserving scapegoat for inefficiencies in the current models of
international jurisprudence or propaganda—nor that it is not.
Instead, this Article proposes, among other things, the idea that
embedded in the seemingly thoughtless reactionary condemnation of
the United States’ action in the hypothetical scenario is a
presumption of U.S. noncompliance with IHL that is often falsely
derived and inevitably hampers international juridical progression.
The presumption arises from a lack of understanding of the
exigencies of occupations, the strategies and theories of insurgencies,
and the way incoherency in the law influences departures from wellestablished legal principles of armed conflict and traditional notions
of morality, all of which this Article seeks to explain.
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I. THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF A CIVILIAN IN AN
OCCUPIED TERRITORY ARE NOT DETERMINED BY THE
LEGALITY OF A HOSTILE NATION’S OCCUPATION
A “territory is considered [legally] occupied when it is . . . placed
under the authority of [a] hostile army,”6 and the occupation exists
only in territories where that “authority has been established and can
7
be exercised.” The fact-based transformation shapes the juridical
personality of the parties and determines the legal duties each party
8
owes to the other. There is no doubt that military occupations
present a unique set of challenges for international jurisprudence.9
Representative of this challenge is the establishment of a satisfactory
standard that regulates the conduct between an occupying force
determined to enforce its will and a civilian populace determined to
resist.10 Although both treaty and customary laws of armed conflict
make civilians immune from attack so long as they are not actively
11
participating in hostilities, the obligations of the civilian populace to
the occupier have been comparatively underdeveloped.
6. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE
¶
351,
at
75
(1976),
available
at
https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMOPublic.nsf/0/588ce7fc87f2b21685256da40050f41d/Body/M2/LOWDocSupp.pdf?OpenElement
[hereinafter FM 27-10] (citing HR, supra note 4, art. 42).
7. Id.
8. The United States’ occupation in Iraq may represent a deviation from long-established
laws governing occupation. On June 8, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 1546, which declared an end to Iraq’s occupation and recognized the Interim
Government of Iraq as the legitimate representative of the Iraqi people and embodiment of
Iraqi sovereignty. S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4987 mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546
(2004). Yet, Iraqi citizens in the province of Fallujah remained occupied when the United
Nations Security Council passed the resolution that recognized the Iraqi Governing Council as
the legitimate representative of all Iraqis, including those in Fallujah. Arguably, the occupying
force had not sufficiently occupied Iraq to satisfy the legal standard in the Hague Regulations.
The U.N. Security Council’s resolution might be construed by some to represent a revolutionary
turn toward a more formalistic determination of occupation in lieu of the traditional factspecific determination promulgated under the Hague Regulations and in national military
manuals such as FM 27-10, supra note 6, ¶ 355, at 76.
9. See GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 315 (1994) (discussing military
occupation in terms of the Israeli occupation).
10. Id. at 316 (noting that “there is simply no satisfactory way legally to regulate the
relations between an occupying party determined to enforce his will and an occupied party
determined to resist him”).
11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 51, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, June 8, 1977
[hereinafter Protocol I]. Protocol I is applicable in cases of international armed conflicts, and,
by virtue of Articles 1(4) and 96(3), is also applicable between a party to Protocol I and “people
fighting against alien occupation.” Id., arts. 1(4), 96(3). Neither the United States nor Iraq is a
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The Hague Regulations are “completely silent on the far more
12
important problem of armed resistance in occupied territory.”
Neither the subsequent Geneva Conventions of 1949 nor the
Additional Protocols of 1977 explicitly ban a civilian in occupied
13
territory from killing or attacking a combatant during occupation.
IHL does, however, authorize an occupying force to “subject the
population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential
to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the
present convention [and] to maintain the orderly government of the
territory.”14 Once the occupier has properly published and enacted
penal rules and other “provisions which are essential,” the civilian
15
populace arguably owes the occupier a duty of peaceful conduct.
Military manuals, including those of two of the world’s major military
16
17
powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, state the

party to Protocol I. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 493-98 (offering a
list of states that have signed Protocol I, which does not include the United States or Iraq).
Nonetheless, many of the provisions of Protocol I are considered customary international law,
and many of the countries that make up the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq are signatories to Protocol
I, including the United Kingdom. See Bradley Graham & Robin Wright, U.S. Works to Sustain
Iraq Coalition; 4 Nations Have Left, 4 More Are Getting Ready to Leave International Force,
WASH. POST, July 15, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/Articles/
A50417-2004Jul14.html (discussing coalition members that “have promised to significantly add
to their contingents” in Iraq). These circumstances, among others, make the provisions of
Protocol I germane to the current discussion.
12. FRITS KALSHOVEN, THE LAW OF WARFARE: A SUMMARY OF ITS RECENT HISTORY
AND TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT 32 (1973).
13. BEST, supra note 9, at 193 (noting that the occupiers’ expectation that occupied people
not indulge their inclination to resist is not “spelled out” in any of the relevant instruments). In
this context, relevant instruments refer to the Geneva Convention of 1949 and Additional
Protocols of 1977; see Protocol I, supra note 11; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Geneva Convention Relative To The
Treatment of Prisoner of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3314, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
14. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 13, arts. 64, 65.
15. See id. (stating that an occupying force may “subject the population of the occupied
territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its
obligations . . . to maintain the orderly government [and] ensure the security of the Occupying
Power”).
16. FM 27-10, supra note 6, ¶ 432, at 86 (“Subject to the restrictions imposed by
international law, the occupant can demand and enforce from the inhabitants of occupied
territory such obedience as may be necessary for the security of its forces, for the maintenance
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civilian’s legal obligation to the occupier as one of peace and
obedience.
Factors that influence a civilian’s obedience to an occupier and
the global community’s expectation of their obedience may be
inextricably connected to factors outside of the individual
combatant’s control. Few would deny there is a growing sentiment
that the extent to which an occupied civilian populace owes a duty of
cooperation and obedience to an occupying force is dependant upon
whether the occupation is legal. The rationale extends from
Rousseau’s philosophy that an occupying force should not be entitled
to claim a right to obedience simply because it is the stronger of the
involved military adversaries; there must be a duty to obey the
18
If the
occupier that arises independent of its relative strength.
occupation is illegal, then the independent duty to obey cannot exist
because the sole basis of obedience extends from the superior military
might of the occupier in spite of the unlawful character of the
occupation.19
Adherents of this view therefore ask, in what sense can mere
strength or force create a legal duty if that duty does not emanate
from an independent legal source? The question is particularly
of law and order, and for the proper administration of the country. It is the duty of the
inhabitants to carry on their ordinary peaceful pursuits, to behave in an absolutely peaceful
manner, to take no part whatever in the hostilities carried on, to refrain from all injurious acts
toward the troops or in respect to their operations, and to render strict obedience to the orders
of the occupant.”).
17. BEST, supra note 9, at 193 (“It is the duty of the inhabitants to behave in a peaceful
manner, to carry on their ordinary pursuits as far as possible, to take no part in hostilities, to
refrain from any act injurious to the troops of the Occupant or prejudicial to their operations,
and to render obedience to the officials of the Occupant. Any violation of this duty is
punishable by the Occupant.”) (quoting THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND, BEING PART 3 OF THE
MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 552 (1958)).
18. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 6-7
(G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950).
19. See generally id. at 6-7. (“The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master,
unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty . . . . Force is a physical power,
and I fail to see what moral effect it can have. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of
will—at the most, an act of prudence . . . . Suppose for a moment that this so-called ‘right’
exists. . .the sole result is a mass of inexplicable nonsense. For, if force creates right, the effect
changes with the cause: every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as
it is possible to disobey with impunity, disobedience is legitimate; and, the strongest being
always in the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest. But what
kind of right is that which perishes when force fails? If we must obey perforce, there is no need
to obey because we ought; and if we are not forced to obey, we are under no obligation to do so.
Clearly, the word ‘right’ adds nothing to force: in this connection, it means absolutely
nothing . . . . Let us then admit that force does not create right, and that we are obliged to obey
only legitimate powers.”).
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relevant when considering the current conflict in Iraq, given that
some world leaders, including United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan, have reportedly declared that the “U.S.-led war on Iraq is
illegal.”20 Noted IHL scholar, Hersch Lauterpacht, reasoned decades
ago that a civilian’s “legal duty to obey” an occupying force is not
21
conditioned upon international law.
Lauterpacht’s view is consistent with the well established
understanding in IHL jurisprudence that jus ad bellum, the right to go
22
to war, is distinct from jus in bello, conduct during war. Indeed,
world powers decided the question regarding the relationship
between civilian duty and the legality of an occupation decades ago.
This position was adopted by the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg (IMT), which considered whether IHL imposed upon the
occupied civilian populace of Greece and Yugoslavia a legal duty of
obedience to the German army where Germany’s invasion was an
illegal act of aggression.23 The IMT held that the provisions of IHL
governing civilian conduct during occupation are unaffected by the
legality, or lack thereof, of one nation’s attack upon another nation:
At the outset we desire to point out that international law makes no
distinction between a lawful and unlawful occupant in dealing with
the respective duties of occupant and population in occupied
territory. There is no reciprocal connection between the manner of
the military occupation of territory and the rights and duties of the
occupant and population to each other after the relationship has in
fact been established. Whether the invasion was lawful or criminal
24
is not an important factor in the consideration of this subject.

The IMT’s stance illustrates a near global expectation of a civilian’s
strict compliance with the law regardless of an inhabitant’s viewpoint
regarding an occupation.
Whether one agrees with the IMT and Lauterpacht regarding a
civilian’s duty to the occupier or finds relevance in the reported

20. Julian Borger & Ewan Macaskill, Iraq War was Illegal and Breached UN Charter, Says
Annan, GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/law/
2004/0916illegal.htm.
21. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 438-39 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th
ed. 1952) [hereinafter Lauterpacht].
22. Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance Of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 367, 370
n.10 (2004).
23. William V. O’Brien, The Meaning of ‘Military Necessity’ in International Law, 1
WORLD POLITY: A YEARBOOK OF STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION
109, 145 n.2 (1957) (quoting NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, Trials of War Criminals
1246-47 (1949-1951)).
24. Id.
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statements of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, it
appears reasonably clear that civilians have, at a minimum, a certain
duty to comply with IHL regardless of whether they believe an
occupation is illegal. Indeed, one of the foremost guiding principles
25
of law is that every “citizen is deemed by the law to know the law,”
as ignorance of the law “provides no excuse for unlawful conduct.” 26
The principle is based “upon the equation of common law with
27
common sense.”
The analysis advanced in the next segments of this Article is
rooted in the proposition that IHL’s purpose is not to produce the
total elimination of particular forms of conduct; but rather IHL’s
more realistic purpose is to produce “some amelioration of the
circumstances which combatants and non-combatants will confront
28
should war break out.” IHL’s purpose “is to regulate hostilities in
order to attenuate hardship.”29 The next Part of this Article broadly
discusses the rights and duties that current juridical models of IHL
impose on its subjects, and how the obligations and privileges that
flow from IHL advance or inhibit its overall goal of civilian
protectionism. The focus in this section is not intended to question
the extent to which civilians and combatants will obey or violate the
law, but rather to illustrate through practical legal reasoning how
incoherency in the law permits civilian and combatants to subvert the
aim of IHL despite literal adherence to the conditions imposed by its
construction.
II. CIVILIANS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ARE
PRECLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING IN HOSTILITIES
This Part discusses whether IHL precludes civilians from directly
participating in hostilities, and how IHL enables or hinders civilian
participation in hostilities. In so doing, this Part relies principally
upon two theoretical propositions regarding law and its impact on

25. PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE
37-38 (2002).
26. RELIGION, LAW, AND FREEDOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, at xvi (Yahya R.
Kamalipour & Joel Thierstein eds., 2000).
27. Id.
28. Ramesh Thakur, Security in the new millennium, in ENHANCING GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A NEW DIPLOMACY? 268, 276 (Andrew F. Cooper et al. eds., 2002).
29. Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Convention’s Blind
Spot, 106 YALE L. J. 2259, 2289 n.178 (1997) (citing Jean Pictet, International Humanitarian
Law: Definition, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, at xix (1988)).
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conduct. The first is Professor Ernest Dworkin’s formalist theory that
any area of law, including IHL, must be coherent in order to be
30
legitimate and justified. Coherence, in this context, is the “unity of
the aspects of an area of law by means of a single, internal, integrated
31
Law is coherent only if its doctrinal elements,
justification.”
institutional acts and structures are validated by some justification
that integrates and unites those elements.32 Alternatively, the law
may be coherent if “the doctrinal elements are justified by differing
intermediate justifications, so long as those intermediate justifications
are all justified and united by a single overarching justification, which
thereby integrates the doctrinal aspects into a mutually supporting
circle.”33 A legal system’s basic structural purpose is “implicit in any
individual feature.”34 The justification or structural purpose that
should be implicit in IHL juridical models is the safeguarding of
35
civilians from excessive and unnecessary violence.
Second, inexplicit obligations and rights can be inferred “from
the values underlying the explicit rules only if the explicit rules are
36
coherent.” When explicit rules are incoherent, then the “principles
and values” underlying them will also be “incoherent, or even
37
contradictory.” This “incoherent or contradictory foundation would
frustrate citizens’ attempts to successfully infer, . . . their inexplicit
38
Each of the aforementioned theoretical
obligations and rights.”
frameworks informs the analysis offered not only in this section, but
throughout the remainder of this Article. This Part analyzes Protocol
I with an eye towards determining the rights and obligations of
civilians in occupied territory and illustrating the lack of coherency in
its construct.

30. Ken Kress, Coherence and Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 646 (1993)
(“[T]he political system can be legitimate only if its explicit rules are coherent.”).
31. Id. at 649.
32. Id. at 648-49.
33. Id. at 649.
34. Id. at 659 (quoting Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485,
511 (1989)).
35. See, e.g., Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The Eleventh Annual Waldemar A. Solf
Lecture: The Changing Nature Of The Laws Of War, 156 MIL. L. REV. 30, 48 (1998) (stating that
the majority in the Erdemoivic believed the purpose of IHL is the protection of the weak and
vulnerable during armed conflict).
36. Kress, supra note 30, at 646.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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To determine the practical impact of IHL on a person in an
occupied territory, it is first necessary to identify the person as either
a combatant or a civilian. These identity classifications are critical in
assessing the person’s rights and privileges under IHL. Combatants,
as noted earlier, can be legally attacked. Due to their status as
combatants, they have the right to be granted prisoner-of-war status if
captured39 and are immune from prosecution for killings that do not
40
violate IHL. In contrast, civilians are immune from attack, as IHL
forbids the intentional killing or targeting of a civilian if the civilian is
not actively engaged in hostile acts.41
One commentator observed that the rationale behind the
separation of the two classes is that targeting any person other than a
combatant would lead to indiscriminate or total war and produce
widespread casualties among innocent civilians.42 A logical extension
of this reasoning appears consistent with basic principles of morality
and traditional notions of impartiality. Therefore, determining who is
properly considered a civilian (that is, one who is immune from
attack) and who is a combatant (one who is privileged to kill and
engage in attacks) is of obvious importance to complying with the law
and maintaining one’s sense of justness and morality. International
bodies have looked to the definitional standards in Article 50 of
Protocol I for authoritative guidance regarding who is legally entitled
to civilian immunity.43 This Part will do the same.

39. Geneva Convention III, supra note 13, art. 4.A (stating that combatants are entitled to
prisoner-of-war status if they: (1) are “commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates”; (2) wear a “distinctive sign recognizable at a distance”; (3) carry their arms
openly; and (4) conduct “their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war”).
The requirements are also set forth under HR art. 1. See also id. arts. 96, 102.
40. Lauterpacht, supra note 21, at 338; Geneva Convention III, supra note 13, art. 99.
41. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 51.
42. See KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, 38-39 (discussing indiscriminate attacks on residential
quarters of industrial centers to attack the workers in the war industry (quasi-combatants) as
leading to attacks on civilians generally).
43. LIESBETH ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 75, 77, 80 (2002) (citing the ICTR and Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Third Report on Colombia’s reliance on Article 50 of Protocol I when analyzing
the definitional standard for the term, civilian, and fashioning a proper scope of civilian
immunity).
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Under Article 50(1) of Protocol I,44 a civilian is understood to be
a person who does not qualify for protection under Article 4.A(1),
(2), (3), and (6) of Geneva Convention III and Article 43 of Protocol
I.45 The definitional stricture, therefore, grants civilian immunity to a
person who is not part of an armed force and who does not qualify for
46
prisoner-of-war status. The civilian immunity provisions of Protocol
I do not explicitly require that the civilian refrain from engaging in
hostile conduct. The literal text of Protocol I permits a finding that
civilian immunity evaporates only “for such time” as the person takes
a “direct part in the hostilities,”47 and, according to at least one
international body, immunity reattaches once the person has ceased
48
direct participation in the hostilities.
Before addressing the problem created by Article 50(1), it should
be understood that direct participation in hostilities, as the term
hostilities is used in Protocol I, has been interpreted to be far
49
narrower than a person’s general participation in the war effort. The
latter encompasses efforts connected with the conduct of the war,
whereas the former comprises behavior that can be described as the
conduct of war, or, warfare.50 Hostilities would include, among other
things, violent acts of psychological, economic, or military warfare.51
General or indirect participation in the war effort, by contrast, would
include the selling of food to a combatant or failing to prevent an
attack by one of the adversaries.52 The latter category certainly does
not strip a person of civilian immunity while the former does. The
44. The United States has not ratified Protocol I, but considers some of its provisions
acceptable practices, though not legally binding. See Nathan A. Canestaro, Small Wars And The
Law: Options For Prosecuting The Insurgents in Iraq, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 73, 105
n.190 (2004). See also Martin P. Dupuis et al., The Sixth Annual American Red CrossWashington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law and the 1977
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L & POL’Y 415, 420
(1987) (statements by Department of State Legal Adviser, Mr. Michael J. Matheson, identifying
Protocol I provisions that the United States recognizes as customary international law).
45. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 50(1).
46. See id. arts. 43, 44, 50, 51 (As Article 44 governs prisoners of war, Article 43 governs
members of armed forces, and Articles 50 and 51 govern protection of civilian populations,
Protocol I purports to grant civilian immunity to people not in either of those categories.)
47. Id. art. 51(3); Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 13(3).
48. See ZEGVELD, supra note 43, at 75 n.49 (citing Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, 84 ¶ 46, OEA/Ser.L/II.1,
Doc. 9, rev. 1 (Feb. 29, 1999)).
49. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 49.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 50.
52. ZEGVELD, supra note 43, at 76.
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inquiry here is whether, by virtue of the initial grant of civilian
immunity, civilians are legally required to refrain from directly
participating in hostilities.
Though not explicitly stated in Protocol I, noted commentators
Hilaire McCoubrey and Jean Pictet contend that civilians, as people
immune from attack, are precluded under IHL from taking direct
53
part in hostilities. Other writers, such as Liesbeth Zegveld, dispute
this contention, arguing that “civilians are not prohibited from
participation in the hostilities.”54 Although the definitional strictures
of Protocol I are ambiguous on this point, the former position offers
more empirical promise, as it is more coherent with the reciprocal
nature of armed conflict and the justification for IHL.
It appears reasonably sound to conclude that, if civilians cannot
legally be made the object of attack by combatants, then civilians
should not be legally permitted to make combatants the object of
attack. Any rationalization to the contrary appears inconsistent with
one of the most fundamental goals of IHL, which is to maintain two
distinct classes. J.M. Spaight, an early twentieth-century scholar,
observed, “[t]he separation of armies [combatants] and peaceful
inhabitants [civilians] into two distinct classes is perhaps the greatest
triumph of International Law. Its effect in mitigating the evils of war
has been incalculable.”55 Indeed, the purpose of those rules is “to
specify for each individual a single identity; [the person] must be
56
either a [combatant] or a civilian.” The British Manual of Military
Law illustrates this point with stark clarity:
Both these classes [combatant or civilian] have distinct privileges,
duties, and disabilities . . . an individual must definitely choose to

53. HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: MODERN
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF WARFARE 178 (2d ed. 1998) (“Nor may civilians
themselves take a direct part in hostilities.”); JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 72 (1985) (reasoning that noncombatants “do not have
the right to participate” in hostilities). Also, the author recognizes the exception that
inhabitants in non-occupied territories, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take
up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular
armed units, are privileged to engage in hostilities provided they carry their arms openly and
respect the laws and customs of war. Geneva Convention III, supra note 13, art. 4.A(6).
54. ZEGVELD, supra note 43, at 76 (contending that “international practice” provides no
support for any interpretation of IHL that civilians are obligated to refrain from directly
participating in hostilities and that such an “obligation does not fit into the humanitarian law
system”).
55. W. Hay Parks, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 493,
514 (2003) (quoting J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 37 (1911)).
56. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 179 (3d ed. 1977).
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belong to one class or the other, and shall not be permitted to enjoy
the privileges of both; in particular . . . an individual [shall] not be
allowed to kill or wound members of the army of the opposed
nation and subsequently, if captured or in danger of life, pretend to
57
be a peaceful citizen.

The excerpt underscores the expectation held by observers that
58
civilians are not to engage in hostile acts. It also embraces at least
one practical aim of the law, which is to maintain two distinct classes
so as to minimize treacherous conduct in order to preserve traditional
notions of justice and respect for life.
Construing IHL, and more specifically, Protocol I, to authorize
civilian participation in hostilities not only imbues Protocol I with the
color of uselessness, it also precludes the treaty from being construed
“as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, [where] the
59
operative words have a consistent meaning throughout.” Article
50(1) of Protocol I, for instance, requires a combatant to assume that
a person is a civilian if there is any doubt as to the person’s true
status.60 An interpretation that allows civilians the right to participate
in hostilities would nullify this rule because the rule presumes that
civilians may not be attacked. Therefore, an interpretation as such is
implausible if the treaty grants civilians the right to participate in
hostilities. Moreover, such an interpretation impedes the restoration
of law and order and effectively creates three identification
classifications: peaceful civilians, hostile civilians, and combatants.
A dual civilian classification scheme would encourage, rather
than prevent, increased violence because it would legally permit a
person to conduct attacks under the guise of being a peaceful civilian
and regain their civilian immunity from attack after they have stowed
61
away their weapons and returned to feigned peaceful conduct. Such
situations lead to both civilian and occupying force casualties. Dual

57. Id.
58. W. Hays Parks, Non-Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International Humanitarian
Law, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 207, 217 (1994) (book review); Parks, supra note 55,
at 514 (relying on Oppenheim for the proposition that “[h]ostile acts by private citizens are not
lawful, and are punishable, in order to protect innocent civilians from harm.”).
59. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995).
60. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 50(1) (stating, in part, that when there is doubt about
“whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian”). Similarly, “[i]n
case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place
of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.” Id. art. 52(3).
61. Id. art. 51(3) (stating that “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section,
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”).
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civilian classification also results in public contempt for the occupying
62
force combatants, despite the legality of their conduct, because it
enhances a hostile person’s ability to operate undercover and conduct
ambushes in order to create insecurity within an occupied territory.63
An additional problem for the international legal community hoping
to prevent total or indiscriminate war is that, when civilians decide to
engage in hostile acts toward the occupier, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to identify them unless these persons distinguish
themselves or are identified by peaceful civilians.64 Without proper
distinction and classification standards, total war becomes imminent
as these conditions enable insurgencies.
As evidenced by the recent U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, the
modern battlefield is replete with insurgents who typically wear
65
civilian clothes rather than uniforms or distinctive insignia. They
typically live or seek shelter within the civilian population and often
maintain very close contact with the portion of the civilian population
that sympathizes with them.66 Insurgents mobilize only a very small
portion of the populace when they first begin their attacks.67 They
organize mainly when they are facing a stronger, heavily armed force
and attempt to make up for their inferior military capacity through
clandestine operations and terrorism.68 But insurgents primarily
depend on the counterattacks of the larger occupying force to
69
mobilize the rest of the population; hence, they create situations in
which the legitimate counterattack kills civilians, so that the ensuing
public outcry and condemnation will strengthen the insurgents’

62. Iraqi Town Protest at Bomb Blast, BBC NEWS, Mar. 1, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/middle_east/4308529.stm; Over 150 Dead in Iraq in One of Deadliest Weekends Since
U.S. Invasion, DEMOCRACY NOW, July 18, 2005, http://www.democracynow.org/Article.pl?
sid=05/07/18/136254 [hereinafter DEMOCRACY NOW].
63. PICTET, supra note 53, at 38-39.
64. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 38-39.
65. See generally David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, War And The Law, IN THE
NATIONAL INTEREST, Mar. 26, 2003, available at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/
Articles/Vol2Issue12/vol2issue12rivkincaseypfv.html (noting press reports highlighted that the
Iraqi Republican Guard and Ba’athist Party militia shed their uniforms and fired on Coalition
Forces wearing civilian clothes).
66. DAOUD L. KHAIRALLAH, INSURRECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 158 (1973);
WALZER, supra note 56, at 179, 184.
67. Id. at 180.
68. PICTET, supra note 53, at 38-39.
69. WALZER, supra note 56, at 180.
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cause.70 In sum, insurgents attack not only occupying forces, but also
71
civilians.
A Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) pamphlet
indicates that it is the people themselves who act as the driving force
72
in armed conflicts. The NLF’s theory was that, if a state waged war
against it, the state would be fighting against civilians, not a separate
and distinct army, and therefore the state would be branded a killer
of men, women, and children.73 Thus, more people would sympathize
with and join the NLF, though it was the NLF that intentionally
74
impeded distinction and increased the risk of harm to civilians. Put
succinctly, the insurgent strategy is designed to place the onus of
discriminate warfare on the occupying army while simultaneously
doing everything within the insurgents’ power to make distinction
impossible.75 This tactic endangers peaceful civilians.
To minimize the occurrence of violence against innocent civilians
during occupations, it appears imperative, as previously discussed,
that international juridical models achieve at least two goals in
protecting civilians from violence. First, the law should permit
civilian immunity only to those individuals who do not actively
engage in hostilities at any time. Second, the law should ensure that
“distinction shall be made at all times between belligerents and the
76
civilian population.” The latest amendments in IHL, which Protocol
I represents, fails in both respects.
The criteria by which insurgents should be required to
distinguish themselves from civilians were debated in the drafting of
Protocol I.77 Because of the presumption that there are certain

70. Id. at 179-80.
71. See Abizaid, supra note 3 (stating that insurgents have killed over 5000 innocent Iraqi
civilians this year alone); Iraq Car Bombing Causes Carnage, BBC NEWS, Feb. 28, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4303629.stm; Fifty Bodies Found in Iraqi River,
BBC NEWS, Apr. 21, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4465769.stm; Double
Car Bombing Rocks Baghdad, BBC NEWS, Apr. 14, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/middle_east/4443409.stm.
72. WALZER, supra note 56, at 180 (noting that “the entire people . . . are the driving
force . . . . Not only the peasants in the rural areas, but the workers and laborers in the city,
along with intellectuals, students, and businessmen have gone to fight the enemy.”).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 28.
77. PICTET, supra note 53, at 38-39 (commenting on the concerns voiced at the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable to Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974–1977 (the “Diplomatic Conference”)).
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situations during armed conflict in which insurgents cannot, without
compromising their lives or the success of their operations, distinguish
themselves from the civilian population, the decision was made to
minimize distinction requirements.78 Stated differently, the classical
view that distinction between civilians and combatants should always
be observed was subordinated to the apparent social or political
desires of certain nations to protect insurgents.
According to some commentators, the changes were adopted to
revise the long standing rule that only states can lawfully establish
military forces and that lawful combatants must operate like regular
forces in order to maintain lawful combatant status;79 and to make
occupations more akin to domestic police actions rather than armed
80
conflicts so that deadly force is used conservatively. One underlying
goal was to promote the lawful status of irregular combatants or
insurgents with hopes that they would, in turn, behave humanely and
in accordance with IHL.81 It comes as no surprise that these
modifications were adopted during the 1970s amidst global
resentment over Israel’s hostilities with the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) 82 and United States’ involvement in Vietnam.83
Under the old requirements, insurgents were granted combatant
privileges if they complied with the requirements set forth under
84
Article 4.A(2), Geneva Convention III, which mandated that
85
combatants carry their arms openly. For example, the United States

78. PICTET, supra note 53, at 39.
79. David B. Rivkin & Lee A. Casey, Leashing the Dogs of War, THE NAT’L INTEREST 57,
61 (Fall 2003).
80. Id. at 63.
81. Id. at 62 (“[M]any who have promoted a ‘lawful’ status for irregular combatants have
done so in an effort to bring them ‘within the system’, in the hope that, once privileged, guerillas
would behave in their own operations.”).
82. See HEATHER WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 119 (1988) (stating that the Diplomatic Conference commenced in
1974, the same year “liberation movements were first extended the privileges of observers in the
General Assembly itself. In October of [1974] the General Assembly invited” the PLO, as
representatives “of the Palestinian people, to participate in the deliberations of the General
Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings”); Rivkin & Casey, supra note 79, at
62 (“Protocol I, at least arguably, eliminates the requirement of government sanction for lawful
combatant status, and the rules requiring uniforms and open carriage of arms are relaxed.”).
83. Rivkin & Casey, supra note 79, at 61.
84. Geneva Convention III, supra note 13, art. 4.A(2).
85. Id. (recognizing that militias and other volunteer armed opposition groups are entitled
to prisoner-of-war status if they: (1) are “commanded by a person responsible for subordinates”;
(2) wear a “distinctive sign recognizable at a distance”; (3) carry their arms openly; and (4)
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recognized the Vietcong Main Forces and Local Forces as lawful
combatants and granted them prisoner-of-war status upon capture
despite being considered irregular “in the way in which they are
raised and in the authority on which they depend.”86 Under the new
formula relaxing the requirements for insurgents to acquire lawful
combatant status, insurgents can gain such status even when they do
not carry their arms openly, except during an attack and the
87
deployment immediately preceding the attack.
As the opening scenario helps illustrate, one problem that arises
immediately from this modification involves its practical effect. The
modification increases the insurgents’ capability to feign peaceful
civilian status and use verbal communications to stage attacks against
lawful unsuspecting combatants. Indeed, the fruit vendors’ ability to
deceive the British soldiers in the opening hypothetical was enhanced
by their ability to pose as peaceful civilians. The argument could be
made that the reality of the modification has only a de minimus
impact on conduct because insurgents do not always have access to
arms as do regular military forces. For instance, the fruit vendors
could have spontaneously decided to pick up an abandoned weapon
and join the attack against the British soldiers after deceiving them.
With respect to those insurgents who do own arms, one view may be
that the modification’s effect on conduct is insignificant because
insurgents, arguably, will not comply with any law that requires them
to carry their arms openly.
Neither position dispels the ways in which Protocol I, at the very
least, better enables insurgents to wage war. By eliminating the legal
requirement to carry arms openly–a measure designed to identify a
person as a combatant–the modification impedes the restoration of
law and order by legally protecting insurgents from being targeted or
attacked except when preparing for an attack or conducting an attack.
Protocol I arguably requires insurgents be treated as civilians when
returning from an attack or planning an attack.88 The practical effect
conduct “their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”). These
requirements are also set forth under HR, supra note 4, art. 1.
86. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 48.
87. PICTET, supra note 53, at 39; Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 44(3).
88. See Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 51(3) (stating that civilians shall enjoy protection
unless and for such a time as they directly participate in hostilities); see also Major Lisa Turner
& Major Lynn Norton, Civilians At The Tip Of The Spear, 51 AIR FORCE L. REV. 1, 28 (2001)
(noting that “a controversial provision of Additional Protocol I allows the civilian to regain his
protection from attack when he ceases direct participation in hostilities”); Rivkin & Casey,
supra note 79, at 62 (“Under Protocol I, irregular forces need to produce their arms and
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of the weakening of the distinction requirements under Article
4.A(2), Geneva Convention III, represents, at least by implication,
approval of the notion that insurgents, like the fruit vendors in the
opening scenario, are permitted to hide themselves within the civilian
community and directly participate in hostilities while posing as
civilians.89
Indeed, the danger to peaceful civilians from cruel and wanton
violence is not only increased when insurgents fight among peaceful
civilians, but also when they fight while disguised as peaceful
90
civilians. Without a proper means to distinguish insurgents from
peaceful civilians or a satisfactory juridical model that permits
insurgents to be subjected to attack and that requires them to
distinguish themselves in the same fashion as occupying forces,
circumstances will always arise that compel occupying forces to treat
all civilians as potential threats.91 This condition not only serves the
strategic aim of the insurgency, it represents incoherency between the
justification of IHL and its construct. The circumstance becomes all
the more revealing when one considers the ambush in the opening
scenario.
Though some may support the ambush as a legitimate form of
war under IHL, the ambush described in the opening scenario is
nothing of the kind. IHL makes a sharp distinction between
treachery and the legitimate ruse. On one hand, Article 23(b) of the
Hague Regulations forbids a person to use treachery to wound or kill
92
during an occupation. While, on the other hand, Article 24 of the
Hague Regulations condones the use of ruses of war.93 Distinguishing
between treachery, which is illegal, and ruses of war, which are legal,
94
is not an easy task under IHL. The divergence helps illustrate why
IHL, and more specifically Protocol I, cannot be construed to endorse
civilian participation in hostilities.

identifying badges only immediately before launching an attack, and can only be targeted
themselves while preparing for an attack or attacking. At all other times, Protocol I requires
irregulars to be treated as civilians, who can be arrested, but not targeted.”).
89. See Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 44(3).
90. WALZER, supra note 56, at 184.
91. Susan Turley, Keeping the Peace: Do The Laws of War Apply? 73 TEX. L. REV. 139,
164-65 (1994) (observing that where circumstances arise where civilian-clad people engage in
combat activity against American Forces, the condition compels the American Troops to view
“every civilian as a potential threat”).
92. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 102.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Surprise, for example, is an essential feature of both treachery
95
and ruses. The concealment and camouflage involved in staging
ambushes “has long been regarded as a legitimate form of combat”;96
however, not all ambushes are lawful. Surprise attacks that are
launched behind the legal cover of noncombatant status, i.e., civilian
status, rather than natural cover, are unacceptable. The introductory
scenario exemplifies this point. Recall that the insurgents were
disguised as unarmed peaceful citizens who, when viewed as such,
were legally immune from attack. It was because of their misuse of
legal immunity, combined with the effect of the “doubt” requirements
under Article 50(1) of Protocol I, that the insurgents achieved their
goal elements of surprise ambush.97 The British soldiers thought they
were coming to the aid of needy victims of violence. Instead, they
were being trapped.
The insurgents’ conduct, though quite effective for their
purposes, was not a legally acceptable form of combat. In fact, it was
98
murder by means of treachery. Conduct is illegal if it betrays the
enemy’s confidence that the person dressed as a civilian will not
99
attack after the enemy has treated that person as a civilian. This
rule, when read in tandem with the scheme of Protocol I, reinforces
the viewpoint that civilians are not to engage in hostilities. The ban
against a civilian’s direct participation in hostilities fits squarely
within the international humanitarian system. One rationale for the
rule is that the wearing of civilian clothes for treacherous purposes

95. WALZER, supra note 56, at 176.
96. Id.
97. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 50(1) (stating, in part, that when there is doubt about
“whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian”). Some might
argue that removal of the doubt requirement is necessary to prevent Protocol I from shielding
insurgents from the consequences of their treacherous conduct of posing as civilians in order to
launch attacks. On one hand, such a revision would appear to lead to an increase in civilian
casualties because combatants might relax their rules of engagements and start to injure or kill
peaceful civilians they mistakenly presumed were hostile civilians or insurgents. On the other
hand, civilian casualties occur because of the continued presence of insurgents within the
civilian community. While the removal of the doubt requirement may expose the civilians to
increased risk, it might compel peaceful civilians to take a personal stake in ridding their
communities of insurgents or take personal steps to distinguish themselves from insurgents.
This proactive response may ultimately result in decreased casualties for both civilians and
occupying forces.
98. See WALZER, supra note 56, at 176-77.
99. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 102-04. The long-established rule against using civilian
attire for treacherous purposes is also codified in Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 37(1)(c).
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increases the possibility that an enemy combatant may not “respect
100
the civilian population.”
Although Article 37(1)(c) of Protocol I reiterates the longestablished rule against feigning civilian or noncombatant status to
attack a combatant, Article 44(3) of Protocol I implicitly makes the
well-settled requirement of combatant-noncombatant distinction
101
discretionary, hence, compromising coherency. As written, the
latter rule enables insurgent activity by sanctioning the position that
“there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of
the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself.”102
Nevertheless, in view of the violence resulting from treacherous
conduct,103 practical legal reasoning, functioning as a subset of
coherence theory, demands that IHL require every person to
distinguish themselves from the civilian populace as a prerequisite to
participating in hostilities.
Indeed, one of the foremost challenges for the lawful combatant
is enforcing IHL against people who will violate IHL in order to exact
violence, whether by misusing internationally recognized protection
signs, posing as peaceful civilians, misusing civilian objects as military
objects, or conducting military operations within civilian populace.
One practical effect that emanates from this circumstance is contempt
for the occupier, arising from its perceived failure to protect peaceful
civilians from harm. Even in situations where a lawful combatant is
responsible for the actual harm or injury to a civilian, contempt for
the combatant may be grossly misplaced where it is the adversary’s
conduct that placed the civilians in harm’s way.
100. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 104-05.
101. Protocol I, supra note 11, arts. 44(3), 37(1)(c).
102. Id. art. 44(3).
103. Treacherous conduct has also included incidents where a civilian-clad suicide bomber
killed by exploding his taxicab, see Ben Montgomery, Local Soldier Dies in Suicide Attack,
TIMES HERALD-RECORD, Mar. 31, 2003, available at http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:dnb
AeaNHixYJ:www.recordonline.com/archive/2003/03/31/bmwrap31.htm+taxicab+killed+four+ir
aq&hl=en&ie=UTF-8. Civilian-clad insurgents feigned surrender only to ambush U.S. service
members as they approached. See Dana Dillon, Perfidy in Iraq: Their Tactics, Our Response,
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Mar. 26 2003, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/
ed032603b.cfm. Insurgents placed peaceful men, women, and children around probable targets
to shield the targets from attack (a tactic generally known as using “human shields”). See U.S.
Forces Kill Human “Shield” Child in Iraq, ABC NEWS ONLINE, May 26, 2005,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200505/s1378052.htm. Non-distinguished persons used
white flags to get close enough to U.S. forces to open fire on the soldiers. See W. Hays Parks,
Capitol Hill Hearing, Hearing on Iraq’s Violations of the Law of Armed Conflict, Apr. 4, 2003,
available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-0404parks.html.
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One of the best-known examples of this condition occurred
during a February 13, 1990, attack on the Al-Firdus bunker during the
104
Persian Gulf War. The bunker had been converted from an air raid
shelter to a command and control bunker.105 The bunker was
camouflaged, surrounded by barbed wire, and protected by Iraqi
106
Unbeknownst to U.S. military planners, Iraqi
armed guards.
authorities permitted “several hundred civilians into the facility.”107
This use of the bunker—which was a legitimate target for attack—
resulted in the deaths and serious injury of the civilians in the
facility.108
The Iraqi government had an obligation under IHL to refrain
from “commingling its civilian population with what was an obvious
military target.”109 Despite its obligation, the Iraqi government
permitted civilians to dwell inside the compound, an action that led
directly to the deaths of the civilians.110 Uninformed observers
nonetheless summarily concluded that the civilian casualties were
caused by U.S. noncompliance with IHL, rather than an Iraqi
violation of the customarily accepted legal principles embodied in
111
Article 58(a) of Protocol I. Either way, the calamity inspired broad
public sympathy for the Iraqis and condemnation of the United
States. In short, the contempt for the occupier, which weaker armies
and insurgents rely upon to strengthen their ranks was effected by the
weaker force’s violations of IHL.
Despite the legality of the attack on the Al-Firdus bunker,
tragedies like it and others that stem from violations of IHL bolster
the proposition that certain provisions of Protocol I do not comport
with practical legal reasoning. For example, Article 52(3) requires a
combatant to presume that an object is non-threatening or civilian in

104. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 615-617 (Apr. 1992), available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/
cpgw.pdf. [hereinafter DOD Report] (Reference can be found at 702.)
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 141.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 617
110. Id.
111. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 58 (stating that “[t]he Parties to the conflict shall, to the
maximum extent feasible: (a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention,
endeavor to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their
control from the vicinity of military objectives.”)
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nature if there is any doubt.112 One practical objection to this
requirement is that “[i]t shifts the burden for determining the precise
use of an object from the party controlling that object” to the party
attacking the object, when in fact the party controlling the object is in
113
a far more informed position to determine its use.
Article 52(3) relaxes the distinction between insurgents and
civilians. This innovation encourages total war, undermines the law,
and improves the insurgents’ strategic capacity. Consequently,
civilians are imperiled because insurgents are better able to disguise
114
threatening behavior as civilian activity.
The by-product of the dreadful effects of this problem compels
occupiers to assume less risk in exposing themselves to harm. This
result, wherein hostile and peaceful civilians are treated the same,
cannot be said to be coherent with protecting innocent civilians from
harm. The helicopter pilot in the opening scenario exposed the
civilians in the building to grave danger, though unintentionally, in his
attempt to minimize the increased risk of harm to the British soldiers.
As demonstrated in the following section, though the collapse of the
building was a horrible incident, whether to assign liability to the pilot
for a war crime requires an examination of the military necessity of
the situation at the time of the attack.
III. A CIVILIAN’S RIGHT TO REMAIN DETACHED FROM
HOSTILITIES SHOULD NOT BE VITIATED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF MILITARY NECESSITY
This section focuses more generally on the conduct of the
occupier, rather than the civilian, in assessing the impact of Protocol I
on the civilian’s right to be free from attack. More specifically, it
posits that if one of the core aims of IHL is to protect civilians from
the unnecessary violence uniquely characteristic of armed conflict,
application of the doctrine of military necessity must cohere with this
juridical goal. As examined here, the proper application and
assessment of military necessity is virtually impossible when there is
no viable method for distinguishing hostile civilians or insurgents
from innocent civilians.
Exacerbating the problem are the
overreaching influences of politics, which often lead military

112. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 52(3).
113. DOD Report, supra note 104, at 616.
114. WALZER, supra note 56, at 179-80.
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commanders to take measures that increase civilian casualties even
when there is no identification problem.
Whether the harm to the civilian populace emanates from an
inability to distinguish hostile civilians from peaceful ones or a need
to satisfy the political objective of minimizing casualties among
friendly forces by reducing exposure to risk, the end result is that
civilians are harmed, albeit unintentionally. This result is not only
inconsistent with the aim of the IHL, but it also undermines the
practical reasoning underlying the law proscribing civilian
participation in hostilities. Whether intentionally or mistakenly,
conditions that give civilians the impression that they are being
attacked raise the question as to whether they should continue to
refrain from participating in hostilities. To avoid this circumstance,
the application of military necessity must comport with the goal of
IHL to protect innocent civilians without exception.
Dr. Francis Lieber, a former Columbia University law
professor,115 and the author of the first “codification of the laws of
116
land warfare,” drafted the most widely accepted theory of military
necessity. Dr. Lieber defined military necessity as “those measures
which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which
are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”117 One of
the best-known judicially reviewed examples of the broad nature of
military necessity comes from the U.S. v. Wilhelm List et al. (the
Hostage case), which was heard before the IMT.118 General Lothar
Rendulic, commander of the Second Panzer Army in Yugoslavia,119
was accused of implementing a “scorched-earth policy on an
enormous scale, effected when the Germans withdrew from the

115. Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of
the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 213, 213-15 (1998). The Lieber definition
appears to be analogous to the definition adopted in FM 27-10. See FM 27-10, supra note 6,
(defining military necessity as that “principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by
international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as
soon as possible”).
116. LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 19 (2002).
117. U.S. WAR DEPARTMENT, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, General Orders 100, art. 14 (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in
Carnahan, supra note 115, at 215.
118. O’Brien, supra note 23, at 140; United States v. List (the Hostage Case), TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL NO.10
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), case 7, reprinted in part in PETER
MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 169-71 (2000).
119. Id. at 170.
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Finmark region.”120 He was tried for “wanton destruction of cities,
121
towns, villages or devastation not justified by military necessity.”
The IMT ruled that General Rendulic, who was “far from
friendly territory and in grave danger of being cut off and annihilated
by the Russian forces,” was justified in ordering the cruel devastation
that left 61,000 civilian “men, women and children homeless, starving,
122
The military result was that General Rendulic
and destitute.”
successfully prevented the Russian Army from overtaking his troops.
The Germans were able to escape. Although the facts revealed that
the enormity of the devastation was not immediately necessary, the
measures were taken to “obstruct the Russian advance and to deprive
them of the use of the buildings, private property and human
resources of the region.”123 Because the act appeared necessary to
General Rendulic’s accomplishment of his military objective, the
tribunal respected his judgment and “ruled that he had acted in
accordance with Article 23(g) of the Hague Rules on Land
Warfare.”124
Although the Hostage case illustrates an application of military
necessity where civilians were left homeless rather than killed or
wounded, the case provides a sound example of its broad and
discretionary application. The broad nature of military necessity does
not, however, obviate the need for a definite and foreseeable
connection between the act committed and the alleged military
necessity. Dr. William O’Brien states “[i]t is not sufficient to claim
that an act not directly related to a legitimate measure of warfare
125
Had the
might contribute ultimately to the enemy’s defeat.”
Germans’ scorched earth tactics that destroyed huge areas of Russia
been motivated by spite rather than military need imposed by the
circumstances of their withdrawal, Rendulic’s acts of devastation
would likely have constituted war crimes.
Without the requirement that some military objective must exist
to justify military necessity, the doctrine would be vulnerable to

120. O’Brien, supra note 23, at 140.
121. Id. (quoting Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Trials of War Criminals (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1950), at xi, 770).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.; Article 23(g) forbids the destruction or seizure of “the enemy’s property, unless
such destruction and seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.” HR, supra
note 4, art. 23(g).
125. O’Brien, supra note 23, at 141.
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widespread abuse and unworthy of juridical value.126 Still, the
seeming ease with which the doctrine may be invoked as a matter of
convenience is a well-known criticism of the doctrine of military
necessity.127 In this vein, questions arise regarding the extent to which
a combatant is obligated to balance the necessity of an attack against
the protection owed to civilians and civilian objects either when
targeting objects such as the Al Firdus Bunker or buildings destroyed
by General Rendulic.
The basic rule is any damage to the civilian populace must be
proportionate to the military objective.
The requirement for
proportionality is designed to balance the competing priorities of
humanitarian principles and military necessity. Its core purpose is to
safeguard civilians from unjustified risks by requiring combatants to
128
It is
weigh military and humanitarian values against one another.
also designed to preclude combatants from conducting operations
that will cause death or injury to civilians and civilian property that is
excessive in relation to the military necessity.129 To satisfy this goal, a
combatant is required to: (1) verify that the target is a military
130
objective; (2) “take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize
collateral damage;” and (3) refrain from destroying a target if it is
apparent that the destruction may be expected to cause excessive
damage.131

126. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF
ARTISTIC MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS 48-49 (1946) (recognizing the risk of military necessity
being used for military convenience); see also Sarah Eagen, Preserving Cultural Property: Our
Public Duty: A Look at How and Why We Must Create International Laws That Support
International Action, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 407, 426 (2001) (noting that military necessity is
sometimes used for personal convenience and, therefore, there is a potential for abuse when
nations involve the concept of military necessity).
127. Id. at 426.
128. William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 539, 545 (1997).
129. Frits Kalshoven, as reported by Charles A. Allen, Implementing Limitations on the Use
of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 39, 44
(1992) [hereinafter Limitations].
130. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 52(2) defines military objectives as “those objects which
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage.” What constitutes an “effective contribution to
military action” and “definite military advantage” has led to much debate and ultimately
inspired disputes over whether an object is, legally, a military object. This discussion goes
outside the scope of the present Article but will be addressed in a subsequent writing.
131. Limitations, supra note 129, at 44; Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 57.
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Examination of the following situation will illustrate the
application of the military necessity doctrine. During the Persian
Gulf War, the government of Iraq positioned two fighter aircraft
adjacent to the ancient temple of Ur, on the theory that the U.S.-led
coalition forces’ respect for the temple as a historical site would
preclude an attack on the aircraft.132 As military objects, the planes
were, of course, subject to attack, and the Iraqis were required by
133
Article 27 of the Hague Regulations to keep the planes away from
the temple of Ur and any other cultural artifacts. The United States’
position was that the Iraqis should bear responsibility for any damage
to the temple as they positioned the aircraft near the protected
structure.134 Despite the military nature of the planes, the legal
analysis did not end there. According to U.S. commanders, the
principle of proportionality demanded that they refrain from
attacking the aircraft because U.S. intelligence indicated that the two
planes were scarcely a military threat without servicing equipment
and any nearby runway.135 Those conditions effectively took the two
planes out of action, thereby limiting the military value of their
destruction when weighed against the risk of damaging the temple.136
The example shows that, though an object may be military in nature,
its destruction, when weighed against humanitarian demands, may
not be warranted.
In considering humanitarian values, U.S. commanders weigh the
expected collateral harm to civilians against the necessity of an attack
either at the time of the attack or in view of the long-term military
and political objectives of the entire campaign.137
Some
commentators criticize the United States’ view based on the premise
that the long-term strategic standpoint of military necessity ignores
the fact that “civilian losses may be disproportionate to the

132. DOD Report, supra note 104, at 615.
133. Article 27 reads:
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as
possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided
they are not being used at the time for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged
to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs,
which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand.
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 27, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277.
134. DOD Report, supra note 104, at 615.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. DOD Report, supra note 104, at 615.
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immediate military goal to be achieved in any particular tactical
138
attack.” Others commentators criticize the view on the ground that
military necessity should apply only to battlefield conditions and
should never take political objectives into consideration.139 Both
views appear to take exception to the doctrine’s vulnerability to social
policy, which this Article discusses shortly. It is first necessary to
understand the fundamental complexities involved in ensuring that
the need for an attack is proportionate to the damage it causes.
At first glance, it appears relatively elementary to “state that
there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate
140
Clearly,
destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects.”
“bombing a refugee camp is obviously prohibited if its only military
significance is that women in the camp are knitting socks for
soldiers.”141 Conversely, an air strike on a large ammunition storage
facility should not be prohibited because a single farmer is plowing
142
nearby. Of course, during armed conflict, many situations arise that
implicate a wide variety of options that could conceivably improve
the odds of winning the conflict. Most of these situations are not as
clearly determinable as the aforementioned examples. More often
than not, balancing the demands of military necessity with
humanitarian considerations is very complex and susceptible to
subjective morality, bias, and reasoning.143 Indeed, an experienced
human rights lawyer, who is a distant onlooker, is very likely to assess
the collateral damage—loss of civilian life or property—in relation to
the intended military necessity much differently than would a military
commander who is responsible for winning the armed conflict.144 This
reality lends credence to the proposition held by some that the
humanitarian portion of the equation is seriously vitiated by
subjectivity.145 This argument is not completely devoid of merit.

138. Dale Stephens, Human Rights and Armed Conflict—The Advisory Opinion of the
International Court of Justice in Nuclear Weapons Case, 4 YALE HUM. RTS & DEV. L .J. 1, 20
(2001) (attributing the remarks to Judith Gardem, Proportionality as a Restraint on the Use of
Force, 20 AUSTL. Y. B. INT’L L. 161, 409 (1999)).
139. Carnahan, supra note 115, at 219.
140. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 545.
141. Id. at 545
142. Id.
143. Id. at 546.
144. Id.
145. Stephens, supra note 138, at 20 (attributing the remarks to Judith Gardem,
Proportionality as a Restraint on the Use of Force, 20 AUSTL. Y. B. INT’L L. 161, 409 (1999)).
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The principle of proportionality, essentially, compels a
combatant to assess the value of innocent human lives in relation to
146
The integrity and effectiveness of the analysis is,
military need.
therefore, vulnerable to the vagaries of human reason: application of
the principle is uniquely dependent upon the military commander’s
concept of who the enemy is and where the enemy is located. A
commander cannot accurately consider collateral harm to a civilian if
he perceives that person to be the enemy. Therefore, ground
conditions that create more difficulty in distinguishing innocent
civilians from hostile civilians or insurgents logically increases the
psychological value the commander will give to military need when
assessing whether an attack on an objective is proportionate. If a
commander mistakes an innocent civilian for an insurgent, despite his
best attempts to comply with the proportionality requirement, the
operation will increase casualties among the innocent civilian
populace.
The dilemma is further exacerbated by the language of Article
51, which permits insurgents to abuse the presumption of innocence
or peacefulness. Indeed, when approaching the rule as strict
textualists rather than from a coherent approach, the rule could
reasonably be construed as authorizing civilians to engage in acts that
negate their immunity, and then permit them to regain that immunity
once they cease the wrongful conduct, provided they are not caught.147
This condition so distorts the term civilian that the presumption of
civilian innocence disappears in the face of hostility. In the eyes of
the combatant, Article 51 does nothing more than turn the civilian
into a sniper by day and a legally immune citizen by night. This
consequence not only undermines the legitimacy of the law, it
ultimately leads to total war, as self preservation compels combatants
to expand the list of targets to be attacked in response to threats and
internal casualties.148

146. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 546.
147. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 51(3) (stating that “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”).
148. Indeed, former Special Assistant for Law of War Matters to the U.S. Army Judge
Advocate General W. Hays Parks urges that the Protocol I legal constraints governing the
conduct of armed conflict are too restraining because they do not take into account a
combatant’s need to destroy the war-sustaining capability of an enemy. See W. Hays Parks, Air
War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 140-46 (1990). To that end, U.S. policy holds that
bridges, railroads, seaports, highways, communication sites, and utility sites, though typically
civilian in nature, may also be attacked if used for military purposes. See DOD Report, supra
note 104, at 613-16. The reported U.S. attack on an Iraqi television station in order to stop the
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The extent to which military commanders should expose their
forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties is difficult to
determine, particularly in light of military commanders’ duty to limit
casualties within their own forces—the most basic military necessity.149
The Herculean challenge lies in the tension between a U.S. military
commander’s duty under international law to minimize collateral
damage and a commander’s duty under domestic law to protect U.S.
troops against the risk of capture and harm. Reducing the risk of
harm to troops, though a widely accepted military practice, may
increase the risk to civilians, albeit unintentionally. Making the
analysis exponentially more challenging are influences of political
objectives on the proportionality equation.
In Kosovo, for instance, an air commander required pilots on
combat missions to fly above 15,000 feet so as to avoid Serbian air
150
defense systems. The limitation reduced the risk of U.S. casualties
and a costly aircraft shoot-down or prisoner-of-war incident that
could have been politically damaging and might have jeopardized
national interests.151 The mandate, however, increased the number of
civilian casualties because the higher altitude made it more difficult
for pilots to positively identify conditions on the ground before
firing.152
Similarly, in February 2002, in Afghanistan, Central
Intelligence Agency officers and U.S. Army officers attached to the
U.S. Central Command watched as a Predator plane, flying thousands
of feet above ground, captured images of a very tall man being
153
The officers “agreed
treated very respectfully by his colleagues.
that the tall man could be Osama Bin Laden.”154 Minutes later,
permission was granted, they fired.155 The attack devastated the area,

Iraqi disinformation campaign illustrates the degree to which traditional civilian objects may
become targets for attack in response to the realities of armed conflict. See Amnesty Int’l, Iraq:
Fear of War Crimes by both Sides, Mar. 26, 2003, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/
index/engmde140442003 (criticizing U.S. attack on Iraqi TV station); Patrick Martin, Media
bosses admit pro-war bias in coverage of Iraq, WORLD SOCIALIST, May 2, 2003,
http://www.wsws.org/Articles/2003/may2003/med-m02.shtml (commenting that BBC and CNN
officials admitted that American broadcast media stations distorted the news and functioned as
information distributors for the Pentagon and Bush Administration during the war in Iraq).
149. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 549.
150. Nathan A. Canestaro, Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial Precision
Warfare, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 431, 477 (2004) [hereinafter Legal and Policy Constraints].
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND 269 (2004)
154. Id.
155. Id. at 269-70.
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but the media later reported that the victims were merely local men
156
scavenging the woods for scrap metal, not Osama Bin Laden.
The incident involving the killing of the three local men, and
others like it, have been criticized as constituting summary executions
in contravention of international law and for encouraging other
157
Despite the
nations to execute anyone they consider a terrorist.
international criticism, incidents like the abovementioned military
operations have been applauded by many Americans as “progress in
the war against terrorism.”158 This circumstance symbolizes a growing
divergence between humanitarian objectives and national policy that
suggests political pressures have the tendency to manipulate the
application of IHL as well as increase or decrease violence depending
on the desired political outcome.
Turning to the flight commander’s decision in Kosovo, the
example provides a careful reminder of how political influences, in
addition to regard for individual safety, affect the proportionality
159
The commander was thinking not only of the impact of
analysis.
losing a pilot, but also of the long-term and political effects of having
a plane shot down. For instance, a captured pilot could give enemy
forces international media notoriety and be used as a tool for
advancing their demands. Though his actions may have been within
the letter of the proportionality rule, the outcome flowing from his
actions hardly comports with the aim of IHL, which is to protect
innocent civilians from the tragic effects of armed conflict. Civilian
safety, undoubtedly, was subordinated by political concerns, much the
156. Id. at 270. It is noted that not all incidents involving the Predator have resulted in
death. During the U.S. conflict in Afghanistan, an American, unmanned aircraft known as the
“Predator” “identified a group of cars and trucks fleeing the capital.” One of the cars was
suspected of carrying Taliban leader Mullah Omar. The Predator followed the cars to a building
where Omar and others were seeking refuge. Despite requests from fighter bombers, General
Tommy Franks denied authority to fire because of the concerns expressed by his Judge
Advocate General. See Seymour M. Hersh, Annals of National Security: King’s Ransom, THE
NEW YORKER, Oct. 22, 2001, available at http://www.hvk.org/Articles/1001/193.html. The
refusal led some officers to complain that they were being refused the right to strike targets
because “of political pressure to avoid a bloody collateral damage incident that would publicly
damage the campaign.” See Legal and Policy Constraints, supra note 150, at 478-79.
157. HERSH, supra note 153, at 268.
158. Id. at 268.
159. One of the best and most critical influences of political concerns upon battlefield
operations reportedly occurred in Iraq, when military commanders halted major attacks
designed to retake insurgent strongpoint cities such as Fallujah and Ramadi until after the U.S.
presidential election. See Mark Mazzetti, Major assaults on hold until after U.S. Election, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, available at http://www.southcoasttoday.com/daily/10-04/10-1104/a02wn655.htm.
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same way the ratifiers of Protocol I subordinated the traditional value
of the combatant-noncombatant distinction when granting insurgents
increased rights to operate during armed conflicts.
In both instances, the means used to achieve the goals of the law
did not produce a result that is coherent with the overall aim of the
160
law. Succinctly put, “[t]he reality of politics leaves the law untidy.”
161
Coherence theory, however, “minimize[s] the effect of politics.” It
achieves this by functioning as a theory of practical reasoning from
ends to means.162 That is to say, through analyzing IHL in a coherent,
outcome-driven manner, obstacles to proper applications, such as
literalism or politics are minimized. Indeed, if one keeps focused on
the aim of IHL, which is to protect civilians, a different outcome can
be reasonably attained.
This discussion should not be taken to imply, however, that
commanders are legally free to make decisions based on their
personal conceptions of fairness and individual biases. Instead, the
contention here is that the law, as written, permits too much
vulnerability to flawed application. Turning to the opening scenario,
the pilot fired the rockets into the building because the insurgents
were using the building to support multiple fighting positions. In
judging whether the helicopter pilot acted reasonably, a person must
163
The extent to
look at the situation through the lens of the pilot.
which the pilot gathered available information and relied on the
information acquired, as well as the accuracy of the information, are
key factors in determining the reasonableness of his attack decision.164
Other factors, such as time, available troops, and combat conditions,
are also taken into account when assessing the reasonableness of
decision to attack.165
As previously stated, the helicopter pilot’s decision could have
been guided by concern that if the British soldiers were captured,
they might become hostages or be murdered on public television.
Both results have tremendous political ramifications. Given the broad

160. JOSEPH RAZ, The Relevance of Coherence, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 261,
298 (1994).
161. Gerald J.Postema, Integrity: Justice in Workclothes, 82 IOWA L. REV. 821, 831 (1997).
162. Murray, supra note 5, at 908.
163. MAJOR KEITH E. PULS, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 2005: INTERNATIONAL AND
OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT 167 (2005) (citing A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE
BATTLEFIELD 66 (1996)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
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nature of military necessity and the subjectivity of any proportionality
assessment, though, other factors make the pilot’s action legally
sound. The pilot’s decision to fire into the foundation of the building
to prevent the team of soldiers from being killed appears reasonable,
as there was a military need to immediately suppress the insurgents’
fire upon the soldiers. The pilot did not know that civilian men,
women, and children were in the building when he fired at it, nor was
there sufficient time for the helicopter team to ascertain the existence
and number of peaceful civilians who may have been in the building
being used by the insurgents to ambush the soldiers. In sum, the
pilot’s application of force, despite resulting in the unfortunate deaths
of innocent civilians, did not constitute the outrageous conduct
proscribed by the IMT. The pilot did not destroy the building for
revenge or out of spite. On the contrary, the pilot made a reasonable
decision in light of the immediate need to stop the attack on the
British soldiers. Had the pilot not acted as he did, the ground team
would probably have been killed.
Despite the media fixation on the results of the pilot’s rocket fire,
the civilian deaths were the result of insurgent misuse of civilian
objects and civilian attire. The result is made possible by the
previously discussed provisions of Protocol I.166 The insurgents
evaded criticism, although it was their conduct that brought about the
civilian deaths. This result is incoherent with Protocol I’s underlying
justification. Application of the law and the means by which conduct
complies with the law should produce an outcome that prevents
treacherous conduct by insurgents rather than restrains the lawful
military options available to occupiers seeking to restore order when
threatened by treachery. The quintessential task, therefore, is
determining what an occupier can do to prevent insurgents from
employing treacherous means of warfare that place innocent civilians
in danger, so that there is coherency between the justification and
outcome produced by implementation of IHL. Some states have
concluded that reprisals are the “only means” to compel a recalcitrant
enemy to cease treacherous conduct during armed conflicts.167

166. See relevant Protocol provisions discussed supra notes 11, 13.
167. PICTET, supra note 53, at 67.
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IV. THE USE OF REPRISALS TO DETER TREACHERY MAY
OBVIATE A CIVILIAN’S DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM
PARTICIPATING IN HOSTILITIES
This Part discusses the law and practice of conducting reprisals
against civilians and explores the legality of using reprisals to stop
treacherous conduct by insurgents. Also discussed is the way social
contractarian theory informs norms relative to reprisals and how this
circumstance has the tendency to hinder rather than restore law and
order within an occupied territory.
A violation of IHL by insurgents or hostile civilians does not
168
legally justify the commission of violations by occupiers.
Nevertheless, reprisals are considered an exception to that rule: they
are self-help measures that would otherwise be unlawful but for their
strict use to compel an adversary to cease illegitimate conduct.169
Reprisals are employed to deter acts of illegitimate warfare, whether
the acts are international violations or otherwise.170 Though at times
reprisals may be an adequate means for making the enemy comply
with IHL, they typically prompt counter-reprisals and their
employment is often abused.171
The qualifying standards for what objects are subject to reprisal
attacks remains so narrow that the term reprisal has been erroneously
used to describe conduct that does not qualify as a lawful reprisal.172
The legal standards are very specific. Reprisals may be employed
only after all other means have been exhausted.173 They must be
174
authorized by the commander-in-chief; proportional to the wrong
committed by the enemy; committed by an actor against an addressee
who are both “states or other entities enjoying a degree of
168. Id. at 90-91.
169. Andrew D. Mitchell, Does One Illegality Merit Another? The Law of Belligerent
Reprisals in International Law, 170 Mil. L. Rev. 155, 156 (2001) (quoting The Naulilaa Case, 8
Trib. Arb. Mixtes 422–25).
170. Lauterpacht, supra note 21, § 248, at 562-63.
171. Id. § 247, at 562; Iraq: Reprisal Killing of Civilian is War Crime, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, May 13, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/13/iraq8582.htm; Paul McGeough,
Fallujah Braces for U.S. Reprisal, THE AGE, Apr. 3, 2004, available at
http://www.theage.com.au/Articles/2004/04/02/1080544690212.html?from=storyrhs;
Michael
Gillespie, Reprisal in Fallujah, Apr. 15, 2004, http://world.mediamonitors.net/content/view/
full/6240.
172. W. Hays Parks, A Few Tools in the Prosecution of War Crimes, 149 MIL. L. REV. 73, 8283 (1995) (offering a list of items and individuals that nations have agreed are protected from
reprisal).
173. Id. at 84.
174. Lauterpacht, supra note 21, § 250, at 564.
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international personality;”175 and they must constitute acts, which
amount to a violation of either the identical or another form of
international law, but undertaken for the purpose of coercing the
addressee to bring its conduct into compliance with IHL.176
A. Legality of Reprisals against Civilians
Unlike the state of jurisprudence that existed during the
American Civil War, it is almost universally agreed that reprisals may
177
178
not be exacted by taking hostages or killing prisoners of wars.
The legality of conducting reprisals against civilians, however, is not
without dispute. Admittedly, moral principle prompts questions
regarding how just it is to punish civilians for acts they did not
commit. The prohibition contained in Article 50179 against levying
punishment upon populations of civilians for the individual acts of
others for which they cannot be held collectively responsible has not
been interpreted to ban reprisals against civilians.180 It remains fairly
undisputed that the Geneva Conventions do not ban “reprisals
181
against enemy civil population.” Protocol I, however, attempts to
ban reprisals against all civilians.182 The ban contained in Protocol I,
though appearing to legally proscribe reprisals against civilians, does
nothing of the sort in a practical sense.
Major military powers such as Italy, Germany, Egypt, and the
United Kingdom, despite ratifying Protocol I, have all reserved the
right to resort to reprisals in the face of serious violations of IHL
183
The United States is
against their respective civilian populations.
not a signatory to Protocol I and persistently objects to the portion of

175. FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 33 (1971) [hereinafter BELLIGERENT
REPRISALS].
176. Id.
177. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 13, arts. 27, 33, & 34.
178. Geneva Convention III, supra note 13, art. 13.
179. The Hague Regulations provide: “No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be
inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they can not be
regarded as jointly and severally responsible.” HR, supra note 4, art. 50.
180. Lauterpacht, supra note 21, § 250, at 565; see also id. § 170, at 443.
181. BELLIGERENT REPRISALS, supra note 175, at 357; see also PICTET, supra note 53, at 67
(endorsing the view that the Geneva Conventions prohibit reprisals only against protected
persons, but permits them “in the conduct of hostilities”).
182. Protocol I, supra note 11, arts. 51(6), 52.
183. Shane Darcy, The Evolution of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals, 175 MIL. L. REV. 184,
226-227 (2003); DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 493-512.
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Article 51 and subsequent Articles of Protocol I that ban reprisals.184
According to U.S. policy, a viable means of combating treachery
available for U.S. soldiers serving in U.S.-occupied territories is the
use of reprisals185 against unprotected civilians.186
At least one noted scholar, Fenrick, contends that certain
reprisals are banned under international customary law,187 which binds
the United States and other nations though they are not parties to
188
I do not concur. International customary law binds
Protocol I.
nations by functioning as a collection of widespread international
practices that states over time come to accept as opinio juris, i.e.,
legally binding.189 States, by their acceptance and subsequent conduct,
create international customary rules.190 Fenrick’s reliance on U.N.
General Assembly and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (I.C.T.Y.) sources regarding the state of
international customary law, without discussion of a state’s official
reservations or objections in shaping customary norms, ignore the
notion that a state’s acceptance is a necessary condition for the
progression of customary international law.191 Fenrick posits that

184. LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 163, at 157; see Martin P. Dupuis et al., supra
note 44, at 426.
185. United States military regulations make clear that reprisals may be taken against
“enemy civilians” or “unprotected civilians,” which can logically be deduced to include the same
category of civilians. See OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE, U.S. NAVY, ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON NAVAL OPERATIONS, Ch. 6, § 6.2.3, at 616, available at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/ILD/chapter6.pdf; see also FM 27-10, supra note 6, ¶
497(c), at 95-96 (allowing reprisals against unprotected civilians).
186. Geneva Convention IV identifies protected civilians as “those who, at a given moment
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands
of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.” Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 13, art. 4. U.S. military manuals explain that protected civilians fall
into two categories. Using the U.S. occupation of Iraq as an illustration, the first category
includes civilian enemy nationals within the national territory of each of the parties to the
conflict, (e.g., U.S. oil workers in Iraq or Iraqi students in the U.S. after the start of the invasion
on March 1, 2003). The second category consists of the population of occupied territories,
excluding nationals of the occupying power or a co-belligerent. See LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK,
supra note 163, at 147–48.
187. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 557-559.
188. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Martin P. Dupuis et al.,
supra note 44, at 420.
189. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1999).
190. Darcy, supra note 183, at 220.
191. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 557-58 (noting that “in view of the Appeals Chamber in the
Tadic Jurisdiction motion, attack on civilian objects are prohibited as a matter of customary law
in all conflicts and [that] this prohibition is reflected in U.N. Resolution 2675”); see also id. at
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reprisals against civilian objects are prohibited as a matter of
192
customary international law in all conflicts because U.N. Resolution
193
2675 suggests that reprisals against civilians in all circumstances are
forbidden.194
To support his position, Fenrick asserts that the legality of
reprisal actions against civilians was considered and rejected by the
I.C.T.Y in the matter of Prosecutor v. Martic,195 where the trial
chamber agreed that the prohibitions against reprisals are an integral
part of customary international law and are to be respected by all
states during all armed conflicts.196 Fenrick’s propositions rest upon
the notion that when international organs such as the U.N. General
Assembly and the I.C.T.Y. concur that a norm is customary, the norm
197
rises to the status of a customary rule of international law. To the
extent Fenrick posits that the Martic decision is establishing
international customary law, he departs from the majority view in
several ways.
First, the fact that the legality of reprisals was not an issue before
198
the trial chambers in Martic makes that entity’s view obiter dicta,
199
and nonbinding on that basis alone.
Second, the Martic decision
does not bind objecting states. Although the judgment of an
international court construing customary international law binds the
parties to the dispute, the court’s opinion does not have the effect of
establishing precedent,200 particularly with respect to a state that has

559 (stating “direct attacks on civilian objects would also constitute a violation of customary law
in all conflicts.”).
192. Id. at 558-59 (citing Decision of Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case No.
IT-95-11-I (1996)).
193. Basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, G.A. Res.
2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Vol. 13, U.N. Doc. A/8178 (Dec. 9, 1970).
194. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 558.
195. Prosecutor v. Marti , Case No. IT-95-11-R61, Decision of Trial Chamber I, (Mar. 8,
1996) (Jorda, J., presiding).
196. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 558-59.
197. Id. at 557-59.
198. Obiter dicta is defined as an “incidental statement in a judgment; legal proposition
which the judge does not consider necessary for reaching his decision and which therefore does
not form part of the ratio decidendi.” A. G. TOTH THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 393 (1990).
199. See Darcy, supra note 183, at 241.
200. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1492, 1527 (2004) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 103, cmt. b (1987)) (recalling “the traditional view that there is no stare
decisis in international law”); see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International
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persistently objected to a rule and does not regard it as binding.201
Because of the positivist characteristics of international law, states
that “do not consent to being bound by treaty norms or to the
development of customary rules . . . [are] not responsible to the
202
international community for non-observance of [the norm].”
Therefore, a state that possesses certain weapon systems or employs
specific measures of waging war that the rest of the world wishes to
ban can prevent the development of a prohibition of those weapons
and measures with respect to itself.203
The same is true for U.N. General Assembly resolutions.
Although U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2675 may represent
204
persuasive authority, resolutions are generally not binding on states,
and the value afforded it in assessing the formation of customary
international law depends on a state’s acceptance thereof, its content,
and its practice relative to the law.205 A state’s position regarding a
certain treaty provision, as expressed through reservations,
statements of interpretation, or implementation made upon
ratification, is relevant in determining state practice and whether a
206
particular rule can be considered an international customary law.
The reservations to Protocol I made by the United Kingdom,207

Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in
Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 179 (2005).
201. Rex D. Glensy, Quasi-Global Social Norms, 38 CONN. L. REV. 79, 106 (2005) (noting
that “customary international law is universal in the sense that its obligations bind all nations
except those that ‘persistently object’ during the development of the customary international
law norm” (quoting Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 189, at 1118-19)) .
202. Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 125, 131 (1997).
203. Id. (relying on IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (4th
ed. 1990)).
204. Shimon Shetreet, Negotiations and Agreements Are Better Than Legal Resolutions: A
Response To Professor John Quigley, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 259, 265 (2000) (noting that
United Nation General Assembly Resolutions may be persuasive of what international law
should be).
205. Henckaerts, supra note 200, at 179.
206. See id. at 182-83.
207. See Protocol I, United Kingdom Reservation, reservation m, available at
http://www.icrc.ch/IHL.nsf/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?OpenDocument
(“The obligations of Articles 51 and 55 are accepted on the basis that any adverse party against
which the United Kingdom might be engaged will itself scrupulously observe those obligations.
If an adverse party makes serious and deliberate attacks, in violation of Article 51 or Article 52
against the civilian population or civilians or against civilian objects, or, in violation of Articles
53, 54 and 55, on objects or items protected by those Articles, the United Kingdom will regard
itself as entitled to take measures otherwise prohibited by the Articles in question to the extent
that it considers such measures necessary for the sole purpose of compelling the adverse party
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Italy,208 Germany,209 and Egypt,210 and the objections of the United
States can, therefore, be said to be an exercise of their right not to be
bound by any attempt to ban reprisals. This fact militates against any
argument that reprisals against civilians are banned under
international customary law, particularly with respect to these
objecting states.211
It should be noted that some commentators assert that
international customary law binds all other states that did not
212
“’persistently object’ during the development of the . . . norm.”
Additionally, there are universally accepted crimes of aggression that
213
can be described as peremptory norms that bind all states.
Reprisals, however, have never been so characterized by the
214
international community, which explains why even the historic
guardian of international humanitarian efforts, the International

to cease committing violations under those Articles, but only after formal warning to the
adverse party requiring cessation of the violations has been disregarded and then only after a
decision taken at the highest level of government.”).
208. See Protocol I, Italy Declaration, available at http://www.icrc.ch/IHL.nsf/NORM/
E2F248CE54CF09B5C1256402003FB443?OpenDocument (“Italy will react to serious and
systematic violations by an enemy of the obligations imposed by Additional Protocol I and in
particular its Articles 51 and 52 with all means admissible under international law in order to
prevent any further violation.”).
209. See Protocol I, Germany Reservation, para. 6, available at http://www.icrc.ch/
ihl.nsf/NORM/259D4F9EF25B0E95C1256402003FB8C0?OpenDocument
(“The
Federal
Republic of Germany will react against serious and systematic violations of the obligations
imposed by Additional Protocol I and in particular its Articles 51 and 52 with all means
admissible under international law in order to prevent any further violation.”).
210. See Protocol I, Egypt Declaration, available at http://www.icrc.ch/ihl.nsf/NORM/
47930B6388C46B08C1256402003FB884?OpenDocument (“The Arab Republic of Egypt, while
declaring its commitment to respecting all the provisions of Additional Protocols I and II,
wishes to emphasize, on the basis of reciprocity, that it upholds the right to react against any
violation by any party of the obligations imposed by Additional Protocols I and II with all
means admissible under international law in order to prevent any further violation.”).
211. Questions remain as to whether a finding that reprisals are legally banned under
international customary law would actually prevent U.S. forces from employing them. The U.S.
Army military manual on land warfare makes clear that while customary law is strictly observed
by United States forces, it is subject to “such exceptions as shall have been directed by
competent authority by way of legitimate reprisals for illegal conduct of the enemy.” FM 27-10,
supra note 6, ¶¶ 7a, 7c, at 10-11.
212. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 189, at 1118-19.
213. Benjamin Ferencz, Can Aggression Be Deterred by Law?, 11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 344,
349 (1999).
214. Frank Emmert, Labor, Environment, Standards and World Trade Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y, 75, 90, n.39 (2003) (recognizing that reprisals may be lawful so long as they
do not violate “peremptory rules of international law (jus cogens)”).
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Coalition of the Red Cross, recognizes that reprisals, albeit limited,
215
are not prohibited under international customary law.
B. The Empirical Effect of Using Reprisals
One of the most difficult tasks for a field commander facing an
enemy that violates the most fundamental laws of war is fashioning a
humane, but effective, way to stop the proscribed conduct, while
216
Sometimes the need to
preserving humanitarian value systems.
obtain this balance requires a departure from accepted means of
conduct.217
Therefore, reprisals seem especially useful for a
commander faced with enforcing the laws and customs of armed
conflict. A French military general once stated that reprisals will
“never disappear, because the laws of war are the laws of necessity,
and it will always be necessary to repress acts of treachery, of bad
faith and of vengeance.”218 Indeed, this was the conclusion reached
during the American Civil War by General Robert E. Lee,
commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, after being informed
by one of his subordinate commanders that six of his men had been
captured and hanged in violation of the law and customs of war.219
Lieutenant Colonel John Mosby advised General Lee of his
intent to conduct reprisals in response to illegal conduct perpetrated
against his men.220 General Lee’s response could not have been more

215. Henckaerts, supra note 200, at 210 (recognizing, via Rule 145 of the 2005 customary law
study, that belligerent reprisals are not legally prohibited but are subject to stringent
conditions); see also ZEGVELD, supra note 43, at 92 (recognizing that international
humanitarian law does not expressly prohibit nor permit reprisals).
216. WALZER, supra note 56, at 304 (recognizing that judgments relative to
“proportionality” and the “usefulness” are “very difficult for soldiers in the field”).
217. Id. at 208-09 (recognizing that French partisans forces killed 80 German prisoners as a
means to stop the German army from executing captured partisans).
218. KARMA NABULSI, TRADITIONS OF WAR: OCCUPATION, RESISTANCE, AND THE LAW
31 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (quoting GENERAL « T » (BRIALMONT), ANGLETERRE ET LES
PETITS ÉTATS 65 (Brussals: C. Muquardt, Librarie Militaire 1875)).
219. John S. Mosby, Retaliation. The Execution of Seven Prisoners: A Self Protective
Necessity, RICHMOND, VA TIMES, Sept. 3, 1899, repinted. in 27 SOUTHERN HISTORICAL
SOCIETY PAPERS 314, 316-317 (1899).
220. Lieutenant Colonel John Mosby wrote: “General, I desire to bring, through you, to the
notice of the government the brutal conduct of the enemy manifested towards citizens of this
district since their occupation of Manassas road . . . . [W]e smashed up one of their trains,
killing and wounding a large number. In retaliation, they arrested a large number of citizens
living along the line and have been in the habit of sending an installment of them on each train.
As my command has done nothing contrary to the usage of war, it seems to me that some
attempt at least ought to be made to prevent a repetition of such barbarities. During my
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demonstrative of the reciprocal nature of armed conflict and a
combatants’ willingness to use reprisals when they believe an
adversary has breached a duty owed to them: “[r]espectfully referred
to the Honorable Secretary of War for his information. I do not know
how we can prevent the cruel conduct of the enemy towards our
citizen[ry]. I have directed Colonel Mosby . . . to hang an equal
number of Custer’s men in retaliation for those executed by him.”221
Mosby explained afterward that the reprisal was not an act of revenge
222
but a judicial sentence intended to save lives, not only those of his
men but also those of his enemy. Because of his actions, no more of
his men were hanged, but Mosby was remorseful for having to resort
to reprisals: “I regret that fate thrust such a duty upon me.”223
The Mosby experience illustrates that combatants may, despite
their desire for the humane conduct of a war, overlook certain rules
of armed conflict or undertake reprisals when they believe the other
party’s breach of legal obligations has freed them from their own
legal obligations.
While some commentators warn that the
application of IHL should never be subject to conditions or operate
as if the duty under IHL is contractarian in nature, they acknowledge
that combatants often condition their obligations during hostilities
upon their adversary’s compliance with certain military or political
224
Although not immediately discernible by some
conditions.
observers, contract theory has influenced normative values during
armed conflict since the beginning of the United States’ participation
in war.225
For instance, when the British army captured American
revolutionaries in 1776, General Washington was informed that as
deserters from the British army, his men could not be considered
226
“It was only the fear of reprisal against British
prisoners of war.
prisoners captured by the American revolutionaries” that caused the
227
British army to spare the lives of General Washington’s men. The

absence . . . the enemy captured six of my men. They were immediately hanged . . . . It is my
purpose to hang an equal number of Custer’s men whenever I capture them.” See id.
221. Id.
222. The form of reprisal Mosby exacted is now illegal. See Geneva Convention III, supra
note 13, art. 13 (stating “[m]easures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited”).
223. Mosby, supra note 219, at 316-17.
224. PICTET, supra note 53, at 91.
225. KHAIRALLAH, supra note 66, at 175.
226. Id. at 197.
227. Id.
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existential aspects of contract theory have continued to remain
characteristic of armed conflict even in modern times.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Israel launched a series of attacks
against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) reportedly
228
Although Israeli attacks failed to achieve full
based in Lebanon.
deterrence, “[t]he rate of PLO attacks against Israel from Lebanon
229
was far below the organization’s capability.” The PLO’s decision to
refrain from conducting attacks commensurate with their capabilities
reflected their unwillingness to invoke a certain magnitude of Israeli
response.230 Though the PLO was willing to suffer losses during its
armed struggle as the cost of pursuing what it believed to be
important political values, “it did not want to lose its territory in
Lebanon, which was very important for its political and
organizational independence.”231 The social condition amounted to
an agreement, albeit conceptual, “through which the level of the
PLO’s terrorist activity was maintained below the threshold that
would, by the [PLO’s] assessment, trigger a massive Israeli
response.”232 Israel, though capable, did not launch any massive
233
Indeed, the Israeli
response until the fragile balance was broken.
government has always classified the PLO members as “terrorists” on
the grounds that “they neither belong to a party to the conflict, nor
conduct their operations in accordance” with IHL, and thus, “are not
entitled to privileged treatment in accordance with the Third Geneva
Convention.”234 Despite this position, the Israeli government has
235
Put differently,
generally treated Palestinians as prisoners-of-war.
each party performs or refrains from conduct of which it is capable in
exchange for the other party’s like consideration so long as they
perceive that an optimal balance is being attained.
The British army’s capitulation and subsequent disregard of its
own policy of considering the American revolutionaries deserters,
Mosby’s reprisal, and the Israeli-PLO conflict all exemplify the sociocontractarian aspect of the relationship between adversaries during

228. Ariel Merari, Deterring Fear: Government Responses to Terrorists Attack, 23 HARV.
INT’L REV. 26, 28 (2002).
229. Id. at 28.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Wilson, supra note 82, at 158.
235. Id. at 160.
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armed conflict. That is to say, there exists a social agreement
between adversaries that supplies the normative blueprint for an ideal
set of conditions that shapes individual behavior within the conflict.
The socio-contractarian commitment largely emanates from the
dictates of rationality and self interest. The examples discussed above
not only confirm the useful effects of reprisals, they validate the
practical dimensions of social contractarian theory. Though sociocontractarian thought processes have remained characteristic of
armed conflict for some time, the use of reprisals, despite their
attractiveness and apparent utility, impedes coherency between the
principle justification of IHL and the outcome produced by its
application, particularly when dealing with insurgencies or opposition
movements.
The German army’s attempt to quell the insurgency in
Independent Croatia between 1941 and 1944 helps illustrate the
detrimental effects of reprisals.236 During the 1940s, a German
occupying force was charged with eliminating partisan opposition to
the Axis Powers.237 The German commander’s resort to repeated
reprisals against the civilian population only generated support for
238
The Partisans became so strong that the German
the Partisans.
army was unable to subdue the Partisans, who, in turn, ultimately
239
gained control of half of Independent Croatia. Similarly, Israel has
also widely employed reprisals with very little deterrent effects.
Indeed, for over half a century, Israel has adhered to a policy of
reprisal, largely to no avail.240 Its Arab neighbors have continued to
sponsor or permit terrorist activity, while Israel has struck at military
and civilian targets in the sponsoring country with no material
reduction in the rate of terrorist attacks despite the loss of civilian
lives.241
Turning to the opening scenario, it does not appear that the
hypothetical helicopter pilot’s conduct in destroying the building
could have qualified as a lawful reprisal, for at least two reasons. As

236. Jonathan Gumz, German Counterinsurgency Policy in Independent Croatia, 1941-1944,
THE HISTORIAN 33, 46 (1998) (stating that Germany’s use of “reprisal measures” against
civilians was “counterproductive”).
237. Id. at 33.
238. Id. at 46 (noting that the German’s use of reprisals against civilians drove “people
toward, not away, from the Partisans.”).
239. Id. at 49.
240. Merari, supra note 228, at 28.
241. Id.
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noted, reprisals are exacted against other nations or international
actors. The insurgents in the scenario do not represent a state and are
not recognized international belligerents. Instead, they are persons
engaged in hostilities committed by unlawful means. Second,
reprisals are actions that would otherwise be unlawful but for the
enemy’s breach of international law.242 As previously stated, the
pilot’s destruction of the building to end the attack upon the trapped
soldiers was justified by the military necessity of the circumstances. It
was, therefore, a legal response and would not qualify as a reprisal.
Based on these two conditions alone, it is doubtful that the helicopter
pilot’s attack on the building in the opening scenario could legally
qualify as a reprisal. Therefore, if the destruction of the building had
not been required by military necessity, the pilot’s action would likely
have amounted to a war crime.
Though the destruction of the building was a purely defensive
maneuver aimed at saving the lives of the British team, it was not
construed in that fashion. One problem faced by occupying powers is
that too often their lawful responses to attacks are viewed as reprisals
or retaliations, and, thus, produce outcomes that are incoherent with
the justification for IHL. As the German army experienced in
Croatia, public outrage and condemnation may create support for the
243
The circumstance evolves primarily from the civilian
insurgency.
populace’s perception that they are either the object of attack or the
occupier is powerless to protect them from attack.244
This condition undermines the logic supporting the proscription
against civilian direct participation in hostilities and weakens the
social contract between civilians and the occupier. The legal right of
the civilian to be free from attack is the legal duty of the occupier,
and, vice versa.245 If peaceful civilians have the right to be free from
attack, then they do not have the right to conduct attacks. Few would
deny that there is also a human right that arises from our nature as
human beings that entitles an individual to certain conduct from all
246
It is comparable to a “contractual right” imposed upon
others.

242. WALZER, supra note 56, at 207.
243. Gumz, supra note 236, at 46.
244. See generally DEMOCRACY NOW, supra note 62, (reporting that an attack upon the
Iraqi civilian populace prompted denunciation of the Iraqi Parliament and a call for a local
militia to take up arms).
245. See Robert Grant, The Social Contract and Human Rights, The Humanist. Vol. 60, p.
18, 20 (January/February 2000).
246. See id.
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others to refrain from acting in a certain way.247 Hence, the
agreement not to kill, albeit implicit, is the condition precedent to
248
peaceful conduct.
Applying this reasoning, when civilians perceive themselves to be
attacked or harmed, they may view such conduct as a breach of the
occupier’s duty to refrain from targeting or harming civilians. As a
result, the civilians may deem themselves freed from their duty to
refrain from participating in hostilities and may begin to engage in
249
hostilities. That is to say, even if there is a duty of obedience or an
obligation to comply with IHL, the moral preeminence of the sociocontractarian influences on conduct may cause the civilian to deem
themselves excused from their obligation to obey the law or refrain
from hostilities. The circumstance can be said to be akin to a
condition in which a promisor deems himself excused from
performing if a promisee breaches his duty to perform under the
contractual theories related to justification for nonperformance or
impracticability. Succinctly stated, despite the mandates of IHL, the
socio-contractarian aspect of armed conflict tends to supersede a
person’s value for the law during occupation and armed conflict.
Practical reasoning, therefore, suggests that it is beneficial for the
occupier and international lawyers to recognize the influence of
socio-contractarian theory upon conduct during armed conflict so as
to avoid juridical gaps in the law that create incoherency and enable
conditions that hinder IHL’s justification and impede the restoration
of law and order in occupied territories.
Despite an occupier’s recognition of the socio-contractarian
nature of armed conflict, the challenge for the occupier is that the
perception of the civilian populace is typically not gleaned from close
examination of the facts or obligations of IHL. Rather, the
perceptions of civilians and other observers are informed by media
coverage and propaganda. This condition suggests that it is vital that
the occupier manage the public’s perception of its conduct just as
carefully and critically as it manages its actual conduct during the
occupation. Educating the civilian populace on the customs and laws

247. See id. at 20-21.
248. See id. at 20.
249. See id. at 20 (“[W]here human rights are abridged or the benefits of social cooperation
are denied, the willingness to observe the basic duties of society is diminished. Denial or
abridgement of the human rights breaches the social contract, which impels those who perceive
themselves as underprivileged to rebel and commit crimes against those they perceived as the
privileged.”).
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of armed conflict may also be helpful. The task of managing
perception requires more attention today than it did during the
Vietnam War, because of the advances in media technology and the
media’s ability to broadcast to large numbers of people in short
periods of time. Perhaps the need for perception management
explains why the U.S. news media have been reportedly biased in
their coverage of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq.250
Though there are some indications that coverage was indeed
biased, there is also evidence that the United States is doing what it
can to comply with IHL. Despite these efforts, the amount of
casualties resulting from the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq—an arena
rife with insurgent activity—strongly suggests the advent of total war
and demonstrates incoherency between the application of IHL and its
justification—of minimizing the impact of war upon the innocent
civilian populace. The impact of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq upon
the civilian populace could not be more justifying of a proper juridical
model.
Research by scientists, including scholars from Johns Hopkins
Bloomsberg School of Public Health251 and Columbia University,252
indicates that since the United States’ invasion of Iraq in March 2003,
253
approximately 100,000 people have been killed and that more than
254
half of the dead were women and children. Granted, many people
doubt the legitimacy of the number of reported civilian deaths. The
credibility of the study appears strong given that most independent
studies, including research conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau
estimate that the number of Iraqi civilian deaths in the comparatively
much shorter Gulf War in Iraq also exceeded 100,000.255
Notwithstanding criticism, the study not only challenges the
credibility of the usefulness of IHL, but also raises the question of

250. See Martin, supra note 119.
251. Les Roberts, Ph.D., and Gilbert Burnham, M.D.
252. Professor Richard Garfield Ph.D, School of Nursing.
253. Les Roberts et al., Mortality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample
Survey, available at http://www.countthecasualties.org.uk/docs/robertsetal.pdf. See also General
John Abizaid Interview, supra note 3, (stating that reports regarding the number of American
servicemen and women casualties in Iraq as of October 2, 2005 were 1,935 killed and 14,755
wounded.).
254. Diane Marie Amann, Foreword, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y J. 1 n.3 (2004)
(noting that “nearly 100,000 civilains, mostly women and children, died in post-invasion
period.”).
255. Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History
of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT’L L. J. 49, 50 n.4. (1994).
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whether we have now approached the level of “total” war witnessed
in the 1940s, which led to the deaths of nearly 1 million civilians,
256
including 600,000 in Germany and 360,000 in Japan.
The current deaths did not occur because of ignorance of the law
or a blanket refusal to obey its conditions. Rather, the harm to the
civilian populace emanates from the incoherent and contradictory
construct of Protocol I, which exists principally due to a concerted
inability among some nations to appreciate the socio-contractarian
aspects of armed conflict and the need for absolute coherency
between Protocol I’s justification and the means to achieve it.
CONCLUSION
This Article has asserted that, due to incoherence between IHL’s
underlying justification and its construct, Protocol I is ill-suited to
achieve its goal of protecting innocent civilians during armed conflict.
Despite the obvious obstacles that insurgencies pose to the
restoration of law and order within an occupied territory and the
resulting harm to the civilian populace that is largely attributed to
identification problems during hostilities, there has been a regression
in juridical requirements historically designed to distinguish
combatants from civilians.
The weakening of distinction
requirements in favor of insurgents and the lack of juridical precision
regarding the definitional standard for civilian status are
contradictory to IHL justification and has a deadly effect on peaceful
civilians and occupying forces alike. The overly broad definition of
the term civilian, under Protocol I, compromises the conceptual
purity of civilian identity, because it arguably can be read to grant
immunity to those persons who are not part of an armed conflict
while authorizing them to engage in hostilities and later rejoin the
civilian populace. This condition compels occupiers to presume that
all civilians are hostile until they act otherwise, and undermining the
authority and credibility of IHL.
This Article has explained how the doctrine of military necessity
and socio-contractarian aspects of armed conflict may impede the
restoration of law and order during occupations by compelling
occupiers to apply the law based predominantly on considerations of
self-preservation and military necessity, rather than humanitarian
imperatives. Indeed, it defies moral reason to expect an occupier to
weigh heavily the harm to innocent civilians under a system of law
256. PICTET, supra note 53, at 52.
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that encourages insufficient distinction standards between a hostile
person and an innocent civilian, while requiring an occupier to
acquire absolute certainty of a person’s true status before defending
against a threat. Indeed, it is doubtful that any legal argument could
persuade an occupying commander to weigh, proportionately and
appropriately, the welfare of civilians against the demands of military
necessity when that commander has been deprived of humanitarian
protections under law, while the noncompliant insurgent enjoys
increased juridical protection.
The mandates of coherency demand that Protocol I be
interpreted to prevent conduct that leads to the type of tragedy
described in the opening scenario. Once a territory is occupied,
within the context of IHL, a civilian’s duty to refrain from
participating in hostilities must be absolute. There must be a clear
prohibition under IHL against any conduct that impedes or
compromises an occupying force’s ability to distinguish insurgents
from peaceful civilians so as to preserve innocent lives. Civilian
immunity should permanently evaporate when civilians engage in
hostilities, or aid and abet anyone who engages in hostilities, against
the occupier. Violations of these requirements should make the
violator subject to penal laws, rather than reprisals, which tend to
lead towards indiscriminate or total war rather than inspire humane
conduct. Such modifications would make the fruit vendors that sent
the British soldiers to the taxicab loaded with explosives liable for
war crimes, which, one must hope, would deter such conduct.
These recommendations are not intended to suggest that civilians
should swear an oath of allegiance to the occupier. Rather, they arise
from an overarching need for coherency between the law and the
practical means to achieve its justification—a measure crucial to
avoiding a total form of war in occupied territories. That said, the
influences of contract theory upon behavior during armed conflict
cannot be ignored. Occupiers must be ever mindful of the way their
conduct informs norms within the civilian community as they weigh
the military value of an attack against the collateral harm to the
civilian populace so that they do not undermine the justification of
IHL, or offend the socio-contractarian balance. Perceived reprisals
against innocent civilians or disproportionate military attacks
constitute, at least by implication, a breach of the occupiers duty to
protect civilians that, in turn, may justify a civilian deeming himself
free from the legal obligation to refrain from participating in
hostilities.
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Simply put, IHL, as a result of Protocol I, leaves itself too
vulnerable to socio-political influences. IHL must be read and
applied so that the application and interpretation of its mandate is
coherent with the outcome achieved by its application.
Interpretations or applications that lead to increased civilians
casualties are inconsistent with the juridical aim of IHL. Without the
implementation of coherency from end to appropriate means, total or
indiscriminate war is inevitable.

